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Epistemic decision theory (EpDT) aims to defend a variety of 
epistemic norms in terms of their facilitation of epistemic ends. One of the 
most important components of EpDT is known as a scoring rule (used to 
measure inaccuracies of credences). This thesis addresses some problems 
about scoring rules in EpDT. I consider scoring rules both for precise 
credences and for imprecise credences. For scoring rules in the context of 
precise credences, I examine the rationale for requiring a scoring rule to 
be strictly proper, and argue that no satisfactory justification has been 
given. I then investigate one possible response to my argument and show 
the problems with this response. The conclusion is that there is a further 
need for justifying the requirement that a scoring rule should be strictly 
proper for precise credences. For scoring rules in the context of imprecise 
credences, an impossibility result has been established in the literature 
purporting to show that no strictly proper, continuous and real-valued 
scoring rule exists. However, a precise statement of the impossibility 
result requires precise definitions both of strict propriety and of continuity 
in the context of imprecise credences. Moreover, the result implies that we 
need to drop one of the three properties - strict propriety, continuity or 
being real-valued - to have a scoring rule for applying EpDT to imprecise 
credences. So, firstly, I offer definitions of strict propriety and of 
continuity and clarify the impossibility result. Then, I investigate what 
will happen if we drop one of the three properties. I argue that we should 
drop the property of being real-valued and I offer the general forms of two 
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Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT) is a young but vibrant subfield of formal epistemology. It
aims to defend a variety of epistemic norms in terms of their facilitation of epistemic ends. One of
the most important components of EpDT is known as a scoring rule (used to measure inaccuracies
of credences). This thesis is a critical study of scoring rules in EpDT, both regarding precise
credences and regarding imprecise credences.
To use a type of scoring rules in EpDT, we usually need to first characterize it, then provide
rationales for using it, and finally exploit the scoring rule to defend some epistemic norms. For
precise credences, some scoring rules are already characterized and widely used in EpDT, and
impressive progress has recently been made based on these scoring rules. With this in mind, my
focus in the context of precise credences will be on the rationales for using these scoring rules.
Specifically, the thesis investigates the rationales for the requirement that the scoring rules should
be strictly proper. For imprecise credences, the characterization task has not been su ciently
tackled, and we do not have an uncontroversial scoring rule yet. For this reason, the focus in the
context of imprecise credences will be on how to characterize a proper scoring rule. Since there is an
impossibility result in the literature that says it is impossible to have a strictly proper, continuous
and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise credences, the thesis discusses which property among
the three - strict propriety, continuity or the property of being real-valued - should be dropped to
have a reasonable scoring rule for imprecise credences. More specifically, the thesis focuses on the
following two questions:
● What is the rationale for requiring a scoring rule for precise credences to be strictly proper?
●Which property - strict propriety, continuity or the property of being real-valued - should be
dropped in response to the impossibility result in the literature about scoring imprecise credences?
1.1 A brief history of Epistemic Decision Theory
The study on rational belief is at the heart of epistemology. And it is natural to employ
decision theory to study rationality. Historically, a lot of defenses of epistemic norms have been
o↵ered by decision theorists (22; 14; 60). Also, (36; 62; 37) used the framework of decision theory
to investigate epistemic rationality.
The kind of EpDT that is of concern in this thesis was first proposed by Joyce in his (29).
The framework of Joyce’s 1998 paper has been adopted by the subsequent researchers. However,
in the first ten years after the birth of EpDT, EpDT did not grow rapidly. There were relatively
few studies or exciting results (24; 17). This situation changed after Joyce published his (30) in
2009 and Leitgeb & Pettigrew published their joint work in 2010 (35). Since then, the study in
EpDT has quickly developed in recent years. Here we list some of the major achievements. In 2011,
Moss used EpDT to investigate epistemic compromise (48). In 2012, Pettigrew defended Principal
Principle (53). In 2013, Easwaran defended (Plan) Conditionalization and Reflection Principle (16).
And Pettigrew further developed his argument for Principal Principle (54). Moreover, Huttegger
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presented another defense of Reflection Principle (28). In 2014, Pettigrew defended the Principle of
Indi↵erence (55). In 2018, Briggs & Pettigrew generalized the framework of EpDT to be strategy-
based and provided an argument for (Plan) Conditionalization (6).
1.2 Outline of the thesis
This thesis consists of two main parts:
● Chapter 2 examines the rationales for requiring a scoring rule to be strictly proper. I
investigate five existing proposals and argue that no satisfactory justification has been given. To
do so, first, I show that each proposal has one problematic assumption, and then I show that the
remaining assumptions are insu cient for the justification. I also consider a long-standing idea of
defending the convexity requirement for scoring rules based on epistemic conservatism and show
the problems with this proposal. The conclusion is that there is a further need to justify the
requirement that a scoring rule should be strictly proper in the context of precise credences.
● Chapter 3 considers the characterization of scoring rules for imprecise credences. An im-
possibility result has been established in the literature purporting to show that no strictly proper,
continuous and real-valued scoring rule exists. However, a precise statement of the impossibility
result requires precise definitions both of strict propriety and of continuity in the context of impre-
cise credences. Moreover, the result implies that we need to drop one of the three properties - strict
propriety, continuity or being real-valued - to have a scoring rule for applying EpDT to imprecise
credences. So, first, I present the definitions of strict propriety and of continuity and clarify the
impossibility result. Second, I investigate what will happen if we drop one of the three properties. I
expose some problems with the so-called mild propriety proposal and with the proposal of dropping
continuity. In addition, I respond to the objections to the proposal of dropping the property of
being real-valued. Finally, I o↵er the general forms of two kinds of strictly proper, continuous and
lexicographic scoring rules for imprecise credences.
2
2 Strict propriety of scoring rules for precise credences
2.1 Background
An important school of thought in epistemology is known as ‘Bayesianism’. There are two
major components of Bayesian epistemology: (i) our beliefs come in degrees, namely, credences;
and, (ii) we should obey some epistemic norms (15). Among these norms, Probabilism may be the
most important one:
Probabilism: A rational agent should never adopt a credence function that is not a probability
function.
One question arises as to how to defend this epistemic norm. That is, why should our credence
functions meet this requirement? Traditionally, arguments in favor of Probabilism are what have
been called the ‘Dutch Book’ argument and the ‘Representation Theorem’ argument. However,
arguments along these lines have long been criticised as being too pragmatic and not su ciently
epistemic. As a result, some philosophers explored a new way of defense that is considered as
non-pragmatic (29; 30; 56). This way has been called ‘Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT)’.
In fact, formal epistemologists have made great progress in defending a variety of epistemic norms
(for precise credences) by applying EpDT. For instance, Pettigrew defended Principal Principle
(53). Easwaran defended (Plan) Conditionalization and Reflection Principle (16). And Pettigrew
further developed his argument for Principal Principle (54). Moreover, Huttegger presented another
defense of Reflection Principle (28). Pettigrew defended the Principle of Indi↵erence (55). Briggs
& Pettigrew generalized the framework of EpDT to be strategy-based and provided an argument
for (Plan) Conditionalization (6).
The basic structure of an EpDT argument in favor of an epistemic norm is as follows (57):
(i) We assume that a legitimate scoring rule for measuring the disutility of a credence (a
credence function) should have a set of mathematical properties.
(ii) We use a decision rule to decide what credence functions are irrational with respect to a
legitimate scoring rule.
(iii) We derive a mathematical theorem, which shows that it is necessary to obey a certain
epistemic norm to avoid being irrational in the sense of (ii).
(iv) Conclusion: a rational agent should obey a certain epistemic norm.
While (ii) is not so controversial and (iii) is just a matter of mathematical derivation based on
the mathematical properties that we have assumed, (i) remains a big challenge faced by the advo-
cates of EpDT. The conclusion of an EpDT argument, no doubt, relies on (i), which specifies what
mathematical properties a legitimate scoring rule should have. However, one property assumed in
(i) is not su ciently well justified.
It is routinely assumed that a scoring rule should be strictly proper, real-valued and
continuous. And the score assigned to a credence (a credence function) by a scoring rule S is
interpreted as the disutility of this credence (this credence function) with respect to S. While the
properties of being real-valued and continuity seem to be natural technical assumptions, strict
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propriety seems questionable.1 (The formal definition of strict propriety is o↵ered in the next
section.) Some authors argue that the adoption of strict propriety needs to be justified (25; 74).
Nevertheless, strict propriety plays an essential role in EpDT. (59) shows that if we assume
a scoring rule to be real-valued, continuous and strictly proper, then we can get the results that
measured with such a scoring rule: (a) every non-probabilistic credence function will be strictly
dominated by one that is probabilistic, and, (b) no probability function will be even weakly domi-
nated. (a) and (b) are the mathematical theorems (namely, (iii) in the EpDT argument) that we
need for defending Probabilism. Besides, (6) shows that along with some natural assumptions, if
we assume that a legitimate scoring rule should be real-valued, continuous and strictly proper, then
we can defend another important norm for Bayesianism: (Plan) Conditonalization. Furthermore,
(67) shows that, for mathematical theorems of this kind, both strict propriety and continuity are
essential. Since strict propriety is pivotal for the defense of Probabilism and Conditonalization in
the EpDT framework, how to justify this requirement becomes an important issue.2
Many authors try to o↵er a justification of the adoption of strict propriety (29; 19; 30; 56; 47).
Here is the general structure of their arguments: if we accept some assumptions that seem to be
epistemically plausible, then we will get some mathematical constraints on our scoring rules. And,
since only strictly proper scoring rules can satisfy all these mathematical constraints simultaneously,
we get the conclusion that only strictly proper scoring rules can be accepted as legitimate. Their
conclusion is that we therefore get a justification of strict propriety. These arguments are valid.
Once we accept all of the assumptions, we have to accept the conclusion. However, I will show that
each proposal has at least one problematic assumption, and without these problematic assumptions,
the other assumptions are insu cient for the justification of strict propriety. I will therefore show
that the existing proposals are all unsatisfactory. After doing so, I will also consider one possible
response to my objection, and illustrate the problems with this response. My final conclusion is
that there is a further need to justify strict propriety in EpDT.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 o↵ers the definition of strict propriety.
Section 2.3 characterizes strictly proper scoring rules. Section 2.4 discusses the proposals in (19;
30; 56; 47). Section 2.5 presents a possible response to my objection and illustrates the problems
faced by this response. Section 2.6 concludes. Appendix I shows why one cannot respond to
my objections by dropping other mathematical properties to block the theorems that support my
arguments. The literature is summarized in Appendix II. Proofs of the theorems are presented in
Appendix III.
2.2 The definition of strict propriety
What does it mean for a scoring rule to be strictly proper? Before answering that, let us first
illustrate what a scoring rule is. In EpDT, a scoring rule is usually applied to measure the epistemic
disutility of credences (credence functions). It measures the epistemic disutility of a credence (a
1See (35; 44; 56) for the discussions on the proprieties of continuity and being real-valued.
2Pettigrew actually argues that we need a stronger theorem to defend Probabilism (56). In his framework, strict
propriety is a necessary condition for defending Probabilism.
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credence function) by assigning scores based on the credence (credences assigned by the credence
function) and on the truth value assignments at world w. Following a standard practice in the
literature, accuracy is taken to be the epistemic value in question in this chapter. Throughout our
discussion, we will assume scores measure degrees of inaccuracy.
To get some intuition on scoring rules, consider the following example:
Example 1. Suppose that there is a coin in front of you. Let H denote the proposition that ‘The
coin will land Head on the next toss’ and let T denote the proposition that ‘The coin will land
Tail on the next toss’. Consider two cases: (i) you decide to adopt 0.2 as your credence to H;
(ii) you decide to adopt the credence function p such that p(H) = 0.2 and p(T ) = 0.8. Imagine
that you throw the coin and observe that it actually lands Head. Let us abuse the notation and
also denote by H the possible world in which the proposition H is true and T is false. Now you
want to get (i) the inaccuracy of the credence 0.2 and (ii) the inaccuracy of the credence function
p. Here are the answers given by the Brier score SBrier, which is an example of a strictly proper
scoring rule (defined below). For (i), you get: SBrier(0.2,1) = (1 − 0.2)2 = 0.64. For (ii), you get:
SBrier(p,H) = (1 − 0.2)2 + 0.82 = 1.28. That means, the inaccuracy of credence 0.2 when H is true
is 0.64, and the inaccuracy of the credence function p at world H is 1.28.
Formally, let ⌦ be a fixed, non-empty and finite set of all possible worlds, and let w denote
a generic possible world.3 Let X be a partition over ⌦. Let X1,X2, ...,Xn be propositions in X ,
such that for each possible world exactly one proposition Xn is true. Let c be a credence function
that assigns to each proposition Xn in X a number in [0,1], that is, c ∶ X ￿→ [0,1]. Let p be a
(finitely additive) probability function. Let  C consist all credence functions on X . And let  P
consist all probability functions on X . Let vw be a characteristic function such that vw(X) = 1 if
X is true at world w (w ∈X) and vw(X) = 0 otherwise (w ∉X).4
Let S be a scoring rule.5 Normally, we assume a scoring rule S to be real-valued.6 Let
SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) be a real-valued local scoring rule that assigns score to each credence
once we know vw(X) = 1/0 at world w.7 Let SG ∶ C×⌦￿→ [0,∞) be a real-valued global scoring
rule that assigns score to each credence function at each world w. SG is aggregated by SL. Or, we
say, SL underlies SG. By assuming Additivity, we get
SG(c,w) = ∑X∈X SL(c(X), vw(X)).
Intuitively, the relationship between the local scoring rule and the global scoring rule shows
that we treat the inaccuracy of a credence function at a world as the sum of the inaccuracy of each
3I borrow some formalism from (30; 35; 56).
4We assume that X is either true or false at world w.
5Throughout our discussion, I will discuss the properties of the global scoring rule and of the underlying local
scoring rule simultaneously. As I will show, based on the assumptions that have been normally adopted, the local
scoring rule and the global scoring rule share almost all the mathematical properties. So, for the most time, to have
a more intuitive understanding, readers can simply bear in mind the local scoring rules.
6In the literature, scoring rules have been assumed to take values in the extended real line R, in which −∞ or
(and) +∞ are allowed to be assigned as scores (22; 21; 59). But this change won’t a↵ect the results in this paper, as
long as the −(+)∞ value are only allowed to be assigned to the end points SL(0,1) and SL(1,0).
7So, a local scoring rule is a pair < SL(⋅ ,1), SL(⋅ ,0) >.
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credence at that world.8
Now, let’s discuss strict propriety. Roughly, a scoring rule S is strictly proper if measured with
it a probability function gets the minimum expected score uniquely with respect to that probability
function. Here is the definition:
Definition 2. A local scoring rule SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly proper i↵∀x, y ∈
[0,1], x ≠ y ∶ xSL(x,1) + (1 − x)SL(x,0) < xSL(y,1) + (1 − x)SL(y,0). Similarly, a global scoring
rule SG ∶  C × ⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly proper i↵ ∀p ∈  P, c ∈  C,p ≠ c ∶ ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) <
∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(c,w).9
It is worth noting that the global scoring rule is strictly proper if and only if the local scoring
rule that underlies it is strictly proper, as also noted in (30; 34).
Theorem 3. SG is strictly proper i↵ the underlying local scoring rule SL is strictly proper.
Example 4. The Brier score, as mentioned earlier, SBrier is an example of a strictly proper
scoring rule. It is defined as: (i)SBrier(x,0) = x2, and, (ii) SBrier(x,1) = (1 − x)2. For the local
case, suppose x = 0.2, then, xSBrier(x,1) + (1 − x)SBrier(x,0) = 0.2 × 0.82 + 0.8 × 0.22 = 0.16. Also,
suppose y = 0.5 ≠ 0.2, then, xSBrier(y,1) + (1 − x)SBrier(y,0) = 0.2 × 0.52 + 0.8 × 0.22 = 0.25.
Obviously, 0.16 < 0.25. For the global case, let ⌦ = {w1,w2} and X = {w1,w2}. Suppose p is a
probability function such that p(w1) = 0.3 and p(w2) = 0.7. Then ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) = 0.3× (0.72 +
0.72) + 0.7 × (0.32 + 0.32) = 0.42. Also, suppose a credence function c such that c(w1) = 0.3 and
c(w2) = 0.4. Then ∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w) = 0.3×(0.72+0.42)+0.7×(0.32+0.62) = 0.51. We can observe
that 0.42 < 0.51, too.
Another property of scoring rules called ‘continuity’ deserves our attention. Normally, we
assume a scoring rule S to be continuous. We say that a local scoring rule SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→
[0,∞) is continuous if and only if both SL(x,1) and SL(x,0) are continuous on [0, 1]. We say that
a global scoring rule SG ∶  C × ⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) is continuous if and only if it is continuous at every
possible world w.
2.3 Characterizing strictly proper scoring rules
The characterization of strictly proper scoring rules dates back to (46), and it has been greatly
developed in (64; 67; 21).10 I will present the work in (21; 59) in this section, since their results are
the most general, which relate strictly proper scoring rules to strictly convex (generalized) entropy
8Another name of it is ‘Separability’. This assumption is important since it bridges the gap between the local
scores and the global scores, which makes us able to defend some norms. Though seems to be a natural assumption,
it indeed faces objections. For discussion on it, see (30; 35; 56). So, it is interesting to investigate other assumptions
that bridge the local scores and the global score. In this chapter, I present the proposal of Schervish et al. in
Appendix 1. However, their assumption is still in an additive form. In the next chapter, following Seidenfeld et al.,
I actually abandon the additive form for scoring rules for imprecise credences. Thanks to Xiong Wei for reminding
me of this.
9I abuse the notation and write c({w}) as c(w).
10See (13) for a detailed discussion on the history of strictly proper scoring rules.
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functions and Bregman divergence.11 This setup is also useful when we characterize strictly proper
scoring rules for imprecise credences in the next chapter.
Suppose that we have a function denoted as EU (x ), which is a function that maps each
credence x to its expected utility EU (x ). That is,
EU(x) = −xSL(x,1) − (1 − x)SL(x,0).
Notice that EU(x) is calculated as the negative of the expected score (as the score function
measures disutility).
By paying closer attention to the definition of strict propriety, one can find that this property
leads to a property of its corresponding EU (x ). In fact, strict propriety of the local scoring rule
entails convexity of EU (x ). That is the basic tool of characterizing strictly proper scoring rules
since (46). Let EU ′(x) be the gradient of EU(x) at point x, by some calculus we get the two
equations below:
(i) SL(x,1) = −EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x), and
(ii) SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x).
Putting results in (21; 59) together, we have the following result: the local scoring rule SL that
is generated from the above equations is strictly proper if and only if its corresponding expected
utility function EU (x ) is strictly convex.12
Let us make this idea precise. Throughout our discussion in this dissertation, whenever we
write f ∶ D ￿→ R, we assume that D is a nonempty convex set in a real vector space and R ⊆ R (R
is the set of real numbers as usual).
Definition 5. A function f ∶ D ￿→ R is strictly convex if ∀x1, x2 ∈ D, x1 ≠ x2,∀  ∈ (0,1) ∶
f( x2 + (1 −  )x1) <  f(x2) + (1 −  )f(x1).
And, here is the formal expression for the idea stated above:
Theorem 6 (Gneiting & Raftery, Predd et al.). A continuous and real-valued scoring rule SL
is strictly proper i↵ there exists the corresponding expected utility function EU(x) that is strictly
convex.
Armed with this result, one can easily derive some strictly proper local scoring rules. And
because of Theorem 2, accordingly, strictly proper global scoring rules can be generated applying
Additivity.
Example 7. Suppose EU(x) = x2 − x. It is a strictly convex function. Then, (i) SL(x,1) =
−EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x) = (1 − x)2, and (ii) SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x) = x2. This is the famous
Brier score SBrier. Since EU(x) is strictly convex, SBrier is strictly proper.
11Another school of thought in epistemology, which has been called ‘Logical Bayesianism’ or ‘Objective Bayesian-
ism’, discusses Shannon Entropy function, which is an example of strictly convex (generalized) entropy function - it
is the associated entropy function of Log score (a kind of strictly proper scoring rule), see (80).
12Savage in (64) actually presents an informal form of this result. And another characterization in (66) has been
proved in (21) as equivalent to this.
7
Another fact about a strictly proper local scoring rule is: SL(x,0) is strictly increasing and
SL(x,1) is strictly decreasing. That’s what the theorem below says. This is a very pleasant fact,
since it fits well with our intuition that the further a credence is from the truth, the more inaccurate
it is.
Definition 8. A function f ∶ D ￿→ R is strictly increasing if ∀x1, x2 ∈ D, x1 < x2 ∶ f(x1) < f(x2). A
function f ∶ D￿→ R is strictly decreasing if ∀x1, x2 ∈ D, x1 < x2 ∶ f(x1) > f(x2).
Theorem 9 (Gneiting & Raftery). If SL is strictly proper and real-valued, then SL(x,1) is strictly
decreasing, and SL(x,0) is strictly increasing, on [0,1].
Example 10. Brier score SBrier, as defined above, is a strictly proper scoring rule. One can notice
that SBrier(x,1) is strictly decreasing, and, SBrier(x,0) is strictly increasing, in [0, 1].
2.4 Attempted proposals for justifying strict propriety
The adoption of strict propriety has a long history. It dates back to (14). Recently, strictly
proper scoring rules have been adopted by a number of epistemologists (24; 19; 30; 56; 6).
As mentioned earlier, one particularly important issue in the context of EpDT is: What is the
rationale for requiring a scoring rule to be strictly proper in EpDT? There are five existing proposals
trying to justify strict propriety. Here is the basic structure of these arguments: first, they argue
that we should accept some assumptions that seem to be epistemically plausible, based on which
they get some mathematical constraints on scoring rules. Second, since only strictly proper scoring
rules can satisfy all these mathematical constraints simultaneously, they get the conclusion that
only strictly proper scoring rules can be accepted as legitimate. That is, the general structure of
these arguments in (29; 19; 30; 56; 2) is:
(i) We should accept a set of assumptions. And, these assumptions lead to a set ofmathematical
constraints on scoring rules.
(ii) Only strictly proper scoring rules can satisfy these mathematical constraints simultane-
ously. So, only strictly proper scoring rules can be regarded as legitimate.
(iii) Conclusion: legitimate scoring rules should be strictly proper.
Their arguments are all valid so our focus will be on their assumptions. In this section, I will
argue that some assumptions are not epistemically plausible, and that without these implausible
assumptions, none of the existing proposals can succeed.13
The first proposal is o↵ered in (19), which relies on two assumptions: Strict Immodesty
Principle (SIP) and Local Strict Truth-Directedness (Local STD).14
The second proposal is given in (30), which is based on three assumptions: Coherent Ad-
missibility Principle (CAP), Dominance decision rule and Global Strict Truth-Directedness
13I do not discuss the proposals in (42; 49; 29; 24; 17; 35), as the discussions in (42; 49; 24; 17) are covered by the
five proposals listed below, and the argument in (35) is rejected by Pettigrew in his (56), and the argument in (29)
has been abandoned by Joyce himself, in favor of a new one (30).
14SIP originates from (40), and it is restated in (19). (19) actually ignores the term ‘strict’ and uses the term




The third proposal is o↵ered in (56), which is based on two assumptions: the assumption
of non-negativity and Decomposition.
The fourth proposal is presented in (47), which is based on three assumptions: Coherent
Admissibility Principle (CAP), Mild Immodesty Principle (MIP*) and Global Strict Truth-
Directedness (Global STD).
Moreover, I once attempted a justification, which relied on three assumptions: Coherent
Admissibility Principle (CAP), Mild Immodesty Principle (MIP*) and Su cient Resolution
(SP).15
In what follows, I will first argue that each proposal has one problematic assumption (assump-
tions in bold, namely, SIP, CAP and the assumption of non-negativity). Then I will show that the
remaining assumptions are insu cient for the justification of strict propriety.
2.4.1 Strict Immodesty Principle (SIP) is unconvincing and empty
First, let us discuss the Strict Immodesty Principle (SIP) assumption advocated in (19). The
idea behind this assumption is that one should have a credence function that has the unique
minimum expected score by the light of that credence function.
Strict Immodesty Principle (SIP): A rational agent should adopt a credence function that
has the unique minimum expected score among all credence functions by its own light with respect
to a legitimate scoring rule S. In other words, a credence function c that has no less expected score
than any alternative credence function by c’s own light with respect to a legitimate scoring rule S
should not be counted as rational.16
So, the mathematical constraint on scoring rules given by SIP can be formally stated as:
Definition 11. A scoring rule S makes a credence function c Immodest i↵ ∀c′ ∈  C ∶
∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c,w) ≤ ∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w). A scoring rule S makes a credence function c
strictly Immodest i↵ ∀c′ ∈  C, c ≠ c′ ∶ ∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c,w) < ∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w). And we say a
scoring rulemakes a credence function c Modest i↵ it is not the case that it makes c Immodest.
SIP Constraint: A legitimate scoring rule S should make all rational credence functions
strictly Immodest.
However, SIP is not obviously convincing, as argued in (56; 45). Their reasons for rejecting SIP
are similar. I state the idea in (56) here. The idea is: it seems natural to expect one’s own credence
function to have no greater expected score than others, since if not, it is better for him to move
to the other credence, which, from his perspective, is better. However, there seems to be nothing
irrational for an agent knowing that another credence function is as good as his and keeping with
his own credence function. In other words, they disagree on whether a rational agent’s credence
function should be the unique best one by its own light.17 So, they only accept the following,
15The name ‘Su cient Resolution’ is suggested by Jiji Zhang.
16The terms ‘Strict Immodesty’ and ‘Mild Immodesty’ are used in (45).
17It is closely related to the discussion on uniqueness thesis. But I will not address this topic in this thesis. See
(69) for a recent discussion.
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weaker principle:
Mild Immodesty Principle (MIP): A rational agent should adopt a credence function
that has a minimum expected score among all credence functions by its own light with respect to
a legitimate scoring rule S. In other words, a credence function c that has greater expected score
than any alternative credence function by c’s own light with respect to a legitimate scoring rule S
should not be counted as rational.18
Under the MIP constraint, the expected score of a rational agent’s credence function need not
be less than other function’s scores. Instead, the expected score of an agent’s credence function
only needs to be no greater than others’ expected scores. The constraint given by this assumption
is:
MIP Constraint: A legitimate scoring rule S should make all rational credence functions
Immodest.
I agree with the objections in (56; 45). Another problem of this proposal is that SIP gives
no real mathematical constraint on scoring rules before one defines the set of ‘rational credence
functions’. That is, without knowing what credence functions should be counted as rational, SIP
Constraint is empty, as also pointed out by Joyce (30).
However, it is hopeless to define a suitable set of ‘rational credence functions’ for the justifica-
tion of strict propriety without already committing to Probabilism. I will state the reason based
on the theorem below:
Theorem 12. Let S be continuous and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. If S is strictly proper,
then S cannot make any non-probabilistic credence function strictly Immodest: it can make all and
only probability functions strictly Immodest.
The above theorem implies that one can choose only probability functions to constitute the set
of rational credence functions, in order to make all rational credence functions strictly immodest
under a strictly proper scoring rule. However, if one assumes this, then he is e↵ectively assuming
Probabilism. Some may claim that even if one assumes this, one is not assuming Probabilism -
one assumes this for some other reason. But what can this reason possibly be? To the best of my
knowledge, no such reason has been spelled out.19
Clearly, one cannot assume Probabilism here because (i) Probabilism is not an intuitive as-
sumption and (ii) to defend Probabilism is one of the goals of EpDT so it cannot be assumed at
the outset. In other words, we want to o↵er a justification for strict propriety because we want to
defend Probabilism. It follows that one cannot define a suitable set of rational credence functions
to make SIP a meaningful constraint and then employ it to defend strict propriety. Therefore,
unfortunately, SIP remains an empty constraint for the justification of strict propriety.20
18Note that the combination of MIP and Local STD is mathematically equivalent to SIP for the purpose of
justifying strict propriety once Probabilism or CAP has been assumed.
19(19) actually assumes Probabilism (Gibbard calls it ‘Coherence’.), though his aim is to defend something di↵erent
from the concern of this thesis.
20This objection can also be applied to de Finetti’s proposal stated in (13), which says that we should accept Brier
score SBrier, since it encourages one to report his own true belief. And he then uses SBrier to defend Probabilism.
One can notice from Theorem 12 that de Finetti’s proposal cannot work either, since SBrier (and, in fact, all
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In summary, SIP is unconvincing (MIP is a more plausible assumption). Furthermore, SIP is
an empty constraint for the purpose of justifying strict propriety, if the ultimate goal is to defend
Probabilism.
2.4.2 Coherent Admissibility Principle (CAP) is dubious and unjustified
To avoid the weakness of the above argument, Joyce put forward the Coherent Admissibility
Principle (CAP) assumption (30). The key idea behind this principle is that since all probability
functions should be considered as permissible prior to evidence, we should not allow a scoring rule
that precludes any probability function prior to evidence:
Coherent Admissibility Principle (CAP): All probability functions, prior to evidence,
should be counted as Admissible with respect to a legitimate scoring rule S.21
This assumption does not say anything about what credence functions are ‘rational’, as Joyce
argued, it only says something about what credence functions are ‘Admissible’ (permissible). So,
it avoids the inevitable circularity problem faced by the above argument.
Several justifications for strict propriety based on CAP have been proposed, and they di↵er
in the decision rules they use for deciding which credence functions are Admissible: Joyce uses the
Dominance principle as his decision rule; Moore & Levinstein use MIP* (slightly di↵erent from
MIP) as their decision rule; and I use MIP* in my attempted justification, too.
Here is the relevant notion of Dominance:22
Definition 13. c
′
dominates c with respect to SG i↵ (i)∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(c′,w) ≤ SG(c,w); (ii)∃w ∈
⌦ ∶ SG(c′,w) < SG(c,w).
Definition 14. A scoring rule S makes a credence function c Dominance Admissible if it is
not the case that ∃c′ ∈ C such that c′ dominates c with respect to S.
Mild Immodesty Principle* (MIP*): A rational agent is not permitted to adopt a cre-
dence function that has a greater expected score than some other credence functions by its own
light with respect to a legitimate scoring rule S. In other words, a credence function c that has
greater expected score than any alternative credence function by c’s own light with respect to a
legitimate scoring rule S should not be counted as Admissible.
MIP* Constraint: A legitimate scoring rule should not make any Admissible credence func-
tion Modest.23
The combination of CAP and Dominance entails the following constraint: a legitimate scoring
rule S should make all probability functions Dominance Admissible. And the constraint given by
real-valued, continuous and strictly proper scoring rules) does not encourage one to report his own true belief if his
belief does not conform to the laws of probability. So, de Finetti’s argument cannot work for those who have not
yet assumed Probabilism.
21This principle was called ‘Minimal Coherence’ in (30).
22The definition o↵ered here has normally been called ‘weak dominance’.
23One may be curious about the di↵erence between MIP and MIP*. Indeed, MIP and MIP* entail the same
mathematical constraint as we assume the property of being real-valued here. But these two assumptions are not
epistemically equivalent: I think MIP is more epistemically plausible than MIP*. However, we do not discuss this in
much detail here, as given CAP, together with STD (discussed below), MIP* and Dominance lead to the same result
in justifying strict propriety, as also noted in (47). In my opinion, Dominance is a pretty intuitive assumption. So
even MIP* has been rejected, one can easily turn to Dominance to make his argument go.
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the combination of CAP and MIP* is: a legitimate scoring rule S should make all probability
functions Immodest.
Similar to SIP, without assuming CAP, both notions of admissibility - Dominance admissibility
and MIP* admissibility - are empty. In other words, if we do not accept CAP, neither Dominance
nor MIP* places a substantial constraint on scoring rules. So, our focus here is on the CAP
assumption.
CAP has been adopted in the literature several times. It has been adopted by (47; 2) recently.
At first glance, it seems to be an intuitive assumption. But by considering the following two
Admissibility principles, one should find CAP dubious.
The first Admissibility principle is what I shall call ‘Extreme Coherent Admissibility Principle
(ECAP)’, :
Extreme Coherent Admissibility Principle (ECAP): No credence function, prior to
evidence, should be counted as irrational with respect to a legitimate scoring rule S.
ECAP says that all credence functions should be Admissible prior to evidence. It is stronger
than CAP since it requires not only all probability functions, but also all non-probabilistic credence
functions, to be Admissible prior to evidence. It seems to me plausible at first glance, too. After
all, what will be the reason for rejecting any credence function prior to evidence (if Probabilism is
not already assumed)?
Or, if you think that ECAP seems to be too strong, let us consider a weaker one:
Some Incoherent Admissibility Principle (SIAP): All probability functions and some
non-probabilistic credence functions, prior to evidence, should not be counted as irrational with
respect to a legitimate scoring rule S.
Obviously, SIAP is weaker than ECAP but slightly stronger than CAP. It requires not only all
probability functions, but also at least one non-probabilistic credence function, to be Admissible
prior to evidence. It seems plausible at first glance, too.
But neither ECAP nor SIAP can be assumed for the purpose of justifying strict propriety with
respect to either Dominance or MIP* decision rule. The reason is: a strictly proper (continuous and
real-valued) scoring rule cannot satisfy either ECAP or SIAP. This fact is based on the following
theorem:
Theorem 15. Let S be continuous and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. If S is strictly proper,
then S cannot make any non-probabilistic credence function Dominance Admissible or Immodest.
The above theorem reveals that if one wants to justify strict propriety, then he cannot assume
ECAP or even SIAP. That is, whoever wants to justify strict propriety via CAP must at the
same time reject SIAP. This again smells of an implicit appeal to Probabilism. What can be a
non-circular reason for favoring probability functions in the formulation of CAP?24
Joyce actually provided a reason for his special treatment of probability functions based on
Lewis’s Principal Principle: “After all, for any assignment of probabilities < pn > to < Xn > it
24(25; 56; 74) present similar objections.
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seems that a believer could, in principle, have evidence that justifies her in thinking that each
<Xn > has < pn > as its objective chance. Moreover, this could exhaust her information about X’s
truth-value. According to the ‘Principal Principle’ of Lewis (1980), someone who knows that the
objective chance of Xn is pn, and who does not possess any additional information that is relevant
to questions about Xn’s truth-value, should have pn as her credence for Xn. Thus, < pn > is the
rational credence function for the person to hold under these conditions.” (See (30), page 279.)25
The above argument can be rephrased as follows:
Premise 1: A rational agent should obey Principal Principle.
Premise 2: For each probability function p, there is a possible world at which an agent has
evidence that the objective chance function is p. Then, according to Principal Principle, a rational
agent knowing that the chance function is p (without knowing the truth values of the propositions
or other inadmissible information) should adopt p as the credence function.
Premise 3: If a scoring rule violates CAP, then there exists at least one probability function
p
′, such that p′ has been precluded and cannot be adopted by a rational agent.
Conclusion: A scoring rule should obey CAP.
This argument is problematic, since it has two suspicious premises.
First, against Premise 1, the Principal Principle is actually a controversial epistemic norm that
requires a defense. In fact, (53; 56) both apply EpDT to defend the Principal Principle. Obviously
their defenses are worth considering only if the setup of EpDT does not already appeal to the
Principal Principle, as Premise 1 does here.26
Second, regarding Premise 2, it is not obvious that every probability function can be considered
as the chance function at some possible world, and more importantly, it is not obvious why some
non-probabilistic function cannot serve as the chance function at some possible world. It seems
to me that if somebody insists that only probability functions can be chance functions, he gets
dangerously close to presupposing Probabilism in the context of the Principal Principle. After
all, the argument o↵ered by Lewis was to build a bridge between chance and probability through
credence. Here is Lewis’ idea: our credence functions, obeying Principal Principle, should be chance
functions sometimes. And our credence functions should be probability functions. Therefore, our
chance functions should be probability functions, too. However, this idea is inapplicable here since
in the present context we cannot presuppose that our credence functions should be probability
functions. On the other hand, if we forget about the bridge between the chance and probability,
and consider there is some possible world at which a non-probabilistic credence function is the
objective chance function, then obeying Principal Principle this non-probabilistic credence function
should be Admissible prior to evidence, too. Consequently, for the same reason in favor of CAP,
we should at least accept SIAP. It follows that the justification of strict propriety via this route
25We use di↵erent notations. Here, < pn > can be understood as the same thing as a probability function p, <Xn >
can be understood as the same thing as a partition X . And Lewis (1980) refers to (41).
26It is not clear whether we should rephrase Premise 1 as ‘A rational agent should obey Principal Principle’ or as
‘A rational agent is permitted to obey Principal Principle’. Both can make the argument go. For the latter case,
the objection to Premise 1 does not apply. But this does not cause trouble to my argument here since I o↵er my
objections to Premise 2, too. Thanks to Daniel Waxman for pointing this out to me.
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will fail, as implied by Theorem 15.
Even if one does not accept the idea that some non-probabilistic function could be an objective
chance function, there is another reason to think that Premise 2 is false. (25) both argue that for
some probability function there could be no possible world at which we have evidence that this
probability function is the objective chance function. Here is an example for illustration.27
Example 16. Imagine a probability function p defined over a two-cell partition {w1,w2}, such
that p(w1) = ⇡4&p(w2) = 1 − ⇡4 , will there be a possible world at which we have evidence that p is
the objective chance function? I do not think so. If we do not assume Probabilism, then we get
to know the chance function only through evidence that are actual or potential frequencies. But
we can never have evidence that p is the objective chance function through evidence. Since any
frequency must be of form m
n
, where m,n ∈ N (N represents the set of natural numbers). And m
n
will by no means be equal to ⇡4 or 1 − ⇡4 (mn is a rational number, but neither ⇡4 nor 1 − ⇡4 is a
rational number). It follows that there will be no possible world at which we have evidence that p
is the objective chance function.
The above example suggests that Premise 2 is false, so Joyce’s argument in favour of CAP
fails. CAP is therefore unjustified. However, some may respond to this example by rejecting either
i) based on actual or potential frequencies, only rational numbers could be considered as chances,
or, ii) only actual or potential frequencies could be considered as evidence. I’d like to say more
about these points here. For i), indeed, there seems to be some chances that are irrational numbers.
But this cannot be known by an agent who does not assume Probabilism and only treats actual
or potential frequencies as evidence. (Recall that we are examining the epistemic plausibility of
CAP.) Why? Since without mathematical theory of probability, one can only get to know chances
based on experience, which are mainly observed frequencies. Obviously, through observation one
can only get to know that chances are some rational numbers. Some may argue that in the long
run we can imagine that the observed frequencies approach to some irrational numbers. But we
imagine these irrational numbers since according to some calculation based on probability theory
we get some irrational numbers as chances. If one does not take probability theory as granted, it
is natural for him/her to take the observed frequencies directly, which are some rational numbers,
to be the supposed chances. After all, there seems to be no reason for him/her to imagine that
some irrational numbers, as the limits of these frequencies, should be chances. For ii), it is hard to
imagine what could be the evidence, apart from actual or potential frequencies, if we do not assume
the knowledge of the mathematical theory of probability, to make us believe that some irrational
numbers are chances at that world. Furthermore, it is even harder to be convinced that these
irrational numbers should jointly conform to the laws of probability (so these irrational numbers
form probability functions).28
To sum up, SIAP and ECAP together reveal that CAP is not as intuitive as it seems. Besides,
27Our example here has a di↵erent purpose from those in (25). (25) argues that there are some kinds of propositions
for which we can find some probability functions that can never be convinced as chance functions, e.g., propositions
about higher order chance. This objection has been responded to in (56).
28Thanks to Daniel Waxman for reminding me of this.
14
since both Premise 1 and Premise 2 (especially Premise 2) in Joyce’s argument for CAP are dubious,
CAP is unjustified yet. Therefore, CAP is a problematic assumption.
2.4.3 The assumption of non-negativity is important but problematic
Pettigrew in (56) uses a divergence measure to construct strictly proper scoring rules. Let d be
a divergence that measures the distance between two credence functions. One crucial assumption
that has been made with d is the assumption of non-negativity. This assumption says that the
distances between two credence functions are non-negative and are 0 if and only if the two are
identical.
Formally, let d ∶  C × C ￿→ [0,∞] be a divergence measure among credence functions, such
that d(c, c′) represents the distance from the credence function c to another credence function c′
(56). And, we have d(c, iw) = SG(c,w) to build the connection between the divergence and scoring
rules, where iw is the omniscient credence function at world w that assigns to each proposition
exactly the truth value of it at world w.
Definition 17. d is non-negative i↵ (i)∀c, c′ ∈  C,d(c, c′) ≥ 0, and, (ii)∀c, c′ ∈  C,d(c, c′) =
0↔ c = c′.
We still do not know what the distance measure d is. Before knowing that, it is hard to
see whether the assumption of non-negativity is plausible. Pettigrew argues that d is generated
by a one-dimensional divergence   and   measures the distance between two credences, such that
 (x, y) represents the distance between the credences x and y. And, d is generated by   through
this equation: d(c, c′) = ∑X∈X  (c(X), c′(X)). So, Pettigrew assumes that the distance between
two credence functions is the sum of the distances of credences assigned by these two credence
functions with respect to  .
So far so good. Something dubious comes as Pettigrew uses another assumption - Decompo-
sition - and gets the equation:  (x, y) = EU(x) − [−xSL(y,1) − (1 − x)SL(y,0)]. In other words,
 (x, y) is calculated as the expected utility of x from x’s perspective minus the expected utility of
y from x’s perspective. Then, we have:
d(c, c′) = −∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c,w) +∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w).
Thus, the assumption of non-negativity assumed with d directly leads to strict propriety. And,
obviously, without the assumption of non-negativity, Decomposition is insu cient for justifying
strict propriety. Now, one question arises: Why can we assume the assumption of non-negativity?
This assumption has been taken for granted just because d is called a distance measure. But it
seems dubious to view d as the distance measure among our credence functions now based on the
equation of d(c, c′). 29 What is more, in what follows, I will argue that if we accept Decomposition,
then the assumption of non-negativity is problematic.30
29Besides, for a distance measure, (ii) of the definition of non-negativity is not necessary, e.g. pseudometric.
30  has been called a ‘Regret function’ in (3; 27).
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To present the argument, we need some definitions. Let cw be the counterpart of c at world
w. Let ￿E￿ be the cardinality of the set E. cw is defined as:
c
w(Z) = ￿{X∈X ∶c(X)=c(Z),vw(X)=1}￿￿{X∈X ∶c(X)=c(Z)￿ ,∀Z ∈X
In plain English, cw is the function that assigns to each proposition exactly the proposition of
the propositions that get the same credence assigned by c as this proposition and are true at world
w among all propositions that get the same credence assigned by c as this proposition.
Here is the definition of Decomposition:31
Decomposition: d(c, iw) = ↵d(cw, c) +  d(vw, cw), where ↵,  ∈ R and ↵,  > 0.
Now, let me show why the assumption of non-negativity is problematic if we assume De-
composition. Recall Example 16, we have p defined over a two-cell partition {w1,w2}, such
that p(w1) = ⇡4&p(w2) = 1 − ⇡4 . Let our omniscient function iw be identical with p, namely,
p(w1) = iw(w1)&p(w2) = iw(w2). If the assumption of non-negativity holds, then we must have
d(p, iw) = 0. Can we get d(p, iw) = 0 if we assume Decomposition? I think not. Since whatsoever
both pw(w1) and pw(w2) must be some rational numbers, we have pw ≠ p and pw ≠ iw. It follows
that d(pw, p) > 0 and d(iw, pw) > 0. Thus, following Decomposition, d(p, iw) would by no means be
equal to 0 - clearly, it will be greater than 0. This reveals that if we accept Decomposition, then
the assumption of non-negativity is problematic. Since Pettigrew assume Decomposition, then the
assumption of non-negativity is problematic. One might argue that in the long run or at an imagi-
nary possible world we can have both d(pw, p) and d(iw, pw) being arbitrarily close to 0. However,
similar to my objection to CAP, before committing to Probabilism, how could one be justified in
believing that?
To summarize, the assumption of non-negativity is taken for granted just because a function
is called a distance measure, which, on a closer look, is problematic. And, without the assumption
of non-negativity, the other assumption is insu cient for justifying strict propriety.
2.4.4 The remaining assumptions are insu cient for justifying strict propriety
So far we have shown that the three assumptions - SIP, CAP and the assumption of non-
negativity - are all problematic. The remaining assumptions of these proposals are:
For the first proposal, we still have: Local Strict Truth-Directedness (STD).
For the second proposal, we still have: Dominance decision rule and Global STD.
For the third proposal, we actually have shown that this justification is unsatisfactory.
For the forth proposal, we still have: MIP* and Global Strict Truth-Directedness (STD).
And for my proposal, we still have: MIP* and Su cient Resolution (SP).
Here are the definitions of some assumptions:
First, it is Strict Truth-Directedness (STD):
31Our focus is not on Decomposition, which has been well studied in (38). Instead, our focus is on examining
whether it is reasonable for us to assume the assumption of non-negativity if we accept Decomposition. The reason
for doing so is: it is hard to have a decisive objection to Decomposition, since it is hard to have a consensus on how
the distance between a credence and the truth value should be measured. (There are a variety of accuracy-related
concerns, and it seems plausible to take the frequencies of truth-values into concern.)
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Strict Truth-Directedness (STD): All credences (credence functions) should get smaller
scores with respect to a legitimate scoring rule S compared with another credences (credence
functions) if they are considered as (uniformly) closer to the truth.
Definition 18. A local scoring rule SL is strictly Truth-Directed if ∀x, y ∈ [0,1], x < y ∶
(i)SL(x,0) < SL(y,0); (ii)SL(x,1) > SL(y,1). A global scoring rule SG is strictly Truth-
Directed if ∀w ∈ ⌦,∀c, c′ ∈  C ∶ (i)∀Xl ∈ X , vw(Xl) = 0,0 ≤ c(Xl) ≤ c′(Xl); and, (ii)∀Xn ∈
X , vw(Xn) = 1,1 ≥ c(Xn) ≥ c′(Xn), and (iii)∃Xm ∈ X , vw(Xm) = 0,0 < c(Xm) < c′(Xm) or
∃Xo ∈X , vw(Xo) = 1,1 > c(Xo) > c′(Xo), then SG(c′,w) > SG(c,w).
STD Constraint: (i) Local STD: A legitimate local scoring rules should be strictly STD. (ii)
Global STD: A legitimate global scoring rules should be strictly STD.
To make our discussion easier, let us present the theorem below to show the relationship
concerning STD between the global scoring rule and its underlying local scoring rule.
Theorem 19. The global scoring rule SG is strictly Truth-Directed i↵ the underlying local scoring
rule SL is strictly Truth-Directed.
And, we know that, similar to SIP, without assuming CAP, the decision rules - Dominance and
MIP* - in the second, forth and my proposals give no real constraint on scoring rules. So, together
with the theorem above, if the remaining assumption of the first proposal, namely Local STD is
satisfied, then the remaining assumptions of the second and the forth proposal are also satisfied.
This understanding helps make our discussion on these proposals more concise.
Second, it is the Su cient Resolution (SR) assumption:
Su cient Resolution (SR): Each credence should get its unique score measured with
SL(x,0) or SL(x,1).
SR Constraint: A legitimate scoring rule SL should be a one-one map.
It is easy to see that SR is even weaker than Local STD. Hence, once Local STD is satisfied,
SR is satisfied, too.
Taken together, if the remaining assumption of the first proposal (Local STD) is satisfied, then
all the remaining assumptions of the five proposals are satisfied.
The scoring rule defined below satisfies the remaining assumption of the first proposal, but
fails to be strictly proper. This scoring rule therefore serves an example to show that the remaining
assumptions are insu cient for the justification of strict propriety.
Example 20. Consider a scoring rule SExample such that its underlying local scoring rule is defined
as SL(x,0) = x;SL(x,0) = 1 − x.32
First, let us show that SExample is not strictly proper. It is easy to see this based on the
theorem below:
Theorem 21. Let S be continuous and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. If we assume that both
SL(x,0) and SL(x,0) are linear, then neither SL nor SG is strictly proper.
32This scoring rule has shown up in the literature several times, see (42; 43; 24; 18).
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In the light of the theorem above, we have: since both SL(x,0) and SL(x,0) are linear,
SExample is not strictly proper.
Now, let us show that SExample satisfies the remaining assumptions of the first proposal. It is
easy to see that SExample satisfies Local STD, since SL(x,0) is strictly increasing and SL(x,0) is
strictly decreasing. Hence, it satisfies the remaining assumption of the first proposal (so it satisfies
all the remaining assumptions of the five proposals). Therefore, it serves as an example showing
that there exists a scoring rule (SExample) that satisfies all the remaining assumptions, but is not
strictly proper. Therefore, the remaining assumptions of the five proposals are insu cient for the
justification of strict propriety.
2.5 A possible response to my objection
In the previous sections, I have argued that the existing proposals are all unsatisfactory.
Specifically, I first argued that some assumptions are problematic, and then showed by example
that without these problematic assumptions the other assumptions are insu cient for justifying
strict propriety.
One way out of my objection is to argue that our scoring rules should be strictly convex and
cannot be linear (my counterexample in the last section features a linear scoring rule). So, in fact,
the response adds some new assumptions on how our scoring rules should behave. Joyce in (29; 30)
contends that our scoring rules should be strictly convex, and they should not be linear or concave
ones.33 Joyce’s argument in favor of convexity in his earlier work (29) was attacked by Maher in
(43) and Joyce provided another defense of convexity in his (30). Here, we focus on Joyce’s later
work.34
Here is Joyce’s argument (rephrased) in favor of convexity:
Premise 1: A rational agent should follow epistemic conservatism, in the sense that he should
not move to another credence function unless he gets evidence in favor of doing so.
Premise 2: A rational agent should decide in accordance with the principle of Maximizing
Expected Utility (MEU).
Premise 3: Measured with a concave or flat scoring rule, a agent will find another credence
functions better than or as good as his in the sense that they have greater epistemic utility from
the perspective of his own credence function. So he would move to another credence function in the
absence of new evidence. Then he violates the principle of epistemic conservatism and is therefore
irrational.
Premise 4: Measured with a strictly convex function, a rational agent will never violate epis-
temic conservatism.
Conclusion: Our scoring rules should be strictly convex.
33In his (30), Joyce o↵ers reasons in support of convexity, but he treats convexity as an optional choice. Here, I
mention this issue since it has been mentioned frequently in the literature (42; 49; 24; 19; 18).
34Joyce o↵ers an example to argue that SExample is not a good scoring rule for it leads to absurd results. I do
not reply to this objection since whether SExample is a good scoring rule is not important for our argument o↵ered
above: SExample only serves as an example to show that the other assumptions are insu cient.
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This argument is actually unsound, since Premise 4 is false without further assumptions, e.g.
CAP or Probabilism. To see why, let us consider a scenario in which an agent actually holds a
non-probabilistic credence function, then measured by any strictly convex function, he can always
find a probability function that gets greater expected utility than his by the light of his own non-
probabilistic credence function. Then he will choose to move to another credence function in the
absence of new evidence. Premise 4 is therefore false: Measured with a strictly convex function, a
rational agent violates epistemic conservatism sometimes, too. Recall that CAP is not yet justified,
as shown in the above section, and Probabilism cannot be assumed for the purpose of justifying
strict propriety. So, this argument cannot work here.
What is more, Premise 1 is dubious, too. Applying epistemic conservatism here is as contro-
versial as the strict propriety assumption. It is controversial in two aspects. First, by allowing
our scoring rules to obey epistemic conservatism in some way, Joyce actually makes our scoring
rules a ‘subjective’ scoring rule, instead of an objective one. This idea has been clearly presented
in (52). Percival & Stalnaker distinguish cognitive utility function from cognitive value function.
According to their theory, cognitive utility functions, on the one hand, take rational agents’ per-
sonal valuations into consideration; cognitive value functions, on the other hand, do not do that.
Cognitive utility functions therefore have some subjective features. Since epistemic conservatism
is a subjective concern, taking it into consideration makes our scoring rules subjective. Then, the
advocates of objective scoring rules (35; 56) will not be satisfied with this subjective feature, and
they therefore cannot accept this reason for convexity. Second, epistemic conservatism is a very
controversial epistemic principle. A lot of epistemologists argue that we should not build our epis-
temology on this principle (11; 76; 12). But, if we require our scoring rules to behave in accordance
with epistemic conservatism, then the progress made in EpDT relies on epistemic conservatism, as
also pointed out in (17). This will not be a satisfactory result for a lot of normative epistemolo-
gists. I am open to both subjective and objective views (and I am more inclined to the subjective
views), so I do not really worry about the first point. But I do care about the second one. I think,
in principle, it is not a good idea to o↵er a defense of convexity based on such a controversial
principle.35
Therefore, I do not think Joyce’s argument is a good response.
2.6 Summary
I have argued that the existing proposals in support of strict propriety are all unsatisfactory.
To do so, first, I show that each proposal has some problematic assumption, and second, I show by
example that the other assumptions are not su cient for the justification. I also propose a possible
way out of my criticism and o↵er reasons for why this response is not good. My conclusion is that
there is a further need to justify the adoption of strict propriety.
35Supporting strict propriety based on conservatism is not a new story. It can be traced back to at least Maher in
his 1990’s work (42), in which he presupposed Probabilism. Maher later retracted the idea. But this approach has
been adopted in (49; 24; 19). For recent objections to building EpDT based on epistemic conservatism, see (73; 72).
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2.7 Appendix 1. Possible responses to my theorems
One may notice that the theorems, in support of my argument, assume several properties of a
legitimate scoring rule simultaneously. These properties are: Additivity, strict propriety, continuity
and being real-valued. So, one may think that we could drop one of these properties to invalidate
my theorems, so to block my arguments. However, this cannot be done, since dropping one of them
lead to problems. In this section, we present the problems.
2.7.1 Dropping continuity
Let us examine what will happen if one drops continuity. Let us reveal two more serious
problems of dropping continuity. Two facts about continuity require notice: (i) a strictly proper
scoring rule can only be discontinuous at most countable many points. In other words, it should be
continuous almost everywhere and it can only be discontinuous at most countable many points; (ii)
if we drop continuity, some strictly proper scoring rules will make some non-probabilistic credence
functions undominated by any probability functions, as shown in (67). Below o↵ers an example
of (ii). For (i), it is hard to convince that a scoring rule is continuous almost everywhere but
it is discontinuous at some points: Why should our scoring rule behave like that? What is the
special reason for treating these discontinuous points di↵erently?36 For (ii), it reveals a conflict
between the defense for Probabilism and the drop of continuity: to defend Probabilism, we need
to show both (a) every non-probabilistic credence function will be strictly dominated by one that
is probabilistic; and, (b) no probability function will be even weakly dominated (25; 30). Without
(a), we cannot get a defense for Probabilism. Since dropping continuity conflicts with the defense
of Probabilism, it is an unacceptable response for normative epistemic theorists.37
In short, neither (i) nor (ii) leads to a pleasant result. So, dropping continuity is not a good
response.
Theorem 22. Let S be strictly proper and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. SL(x,0) and SL(x,1)
should be continuous at all but countably many points.38
Here is an example of (ii) in (67).
Example 23 (Shervish et al.). Suppose we have the following discontinuous scoring rule:
SL(x,0) =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
x2, 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5;
0.5 + x2,0.5 < x ≤ 1. SL(x,1) =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0.5 + (1 − x)2,0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5;
(1 − x)2,0.5 < x ≤ 1.
It is not hard to see that the scoring rule defined above is strictly proper and real-valued:
since the associate EU = (i)x2 − 1.5x,0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5;= (ii)x2 − 0.5x − 0,0.5 < x ≤ 1. It can be noticed
that the associated EU is strictly convex. Besides, we have S(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x), and,
36This question concerns the reason for treating them di↵erently without special reason being o↵ered. Sometimes
we have some special reason for treating some points di↵erently.
37Readers may notice from this section that besides strict propriety, continuity is also important. And they may
want to know the rationale for requiring a scoring rule to be continuous. Since continuity is not the topic discussed
in this paper, interesting readers can refer to (30; 56) for discussion. I remain skeptical about this assumption.
38(66) makes a remark on this point.
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S(x,1) = −EU(x)−(1−x)EU ′(x).39 So according to Theorem 6, (i) defines a strictly proper scoring
rule. However, some non-probabilistic credence functions will be undominated by any probability
function with measured with this scoring rule. For example, suppose ⌦ = {w1,w2}, To ignore
{} again and let X = {w1,w2}. Now suppose we have a credence function c ∉  P such that
c(w1) = 0.6&c(w2) = 0.7. However, c will not be dominated by any probability function.
2.7.2 Dropping the property of being real-valued
One may also consider to drop the property of being real-valued. However, this cannot work if
we define strict propriety as what we have done in the literature. Note that the original definition
of strict propriety assumes the property of being real-valued. To o↵er a response from this angle,
one should reconsider the definition of strict propriety. I will not say too much about this point
here.
2.7.3 Dropping Additivity
Schervish et al. in (67) actually relax the assumption of Additivity. Instead of assuming that
the overall score of a credence function is the sum of each credence with respect to a scoring rule,
they assume that the overall score of a credence function is the sum of each credence with respect
to a set of scoring rules: each credence is measured with a scoring rule from the set. They also
assume that each scoring rule in the set should be real-valued, continuous and strictly proper.
Then they show that measured with the scoring rules from this set, we can get the results that, (a)
every non-probabilistic credence function will be strictly dominated by one that is probabilistic,
and, (b) no probability function will be even weakly dominated. These results are exactly the same
as what we get by assuming Additivity. So, in this situation, we still get the same impossibility
theorems. That means, relaxing Additivity in this way cannot avoid the impossibility theorems
that we present in this paper.
One may consider to drop Additivity at all. But dropping Additivity faces the problem of
providing us with another assumption to build the connection between the score of each credence
and the score of each credence function. Without assuming a connection between them, we cannot
use the existing scoring rules to defend epistemic norms. What will this assumption be then?
2.8 Appendix II Related literature
2.8.1 Main results used in this paper from Gneiting & Raftery (2007)
Assumptions: Let SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [−∞,+∞] be a scoring rule, where the values (+/-)∞
are only allowed to be assigned to the end pints SL(0,1) and SL(1,0). Let EU ′(x) be a sub-gradient
of EU at point x, in the sense that EU(x) ≥ EU(y) +EU ′(y)(x − y), x, y ∈ [0,1]. Below are two
results that have been used in this paper:
39Here, we apply Gneiting & Raftery Theorem listed in Appendix II, which can deal with the case in which EU(x)
is not di↵erentiable at some point.
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Gneiting & Raftery theorem: A scoring rule S is proper i↵ there exists a EU(x) such that EU(x)
is convex, and EU(x) = −xSL(x,1)− (1− x)SL(x,0) with (i)SL(x,1) = −EU(x)− (1− x)EU ′(x), and
(ii) SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x). A scoring rule S is strictly proper i↵ EU(x) is strictly convex,
where EU(x) = −xSL(x,1) − (1 − x)SL(x,0) with (i)SL(x,1) = −EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x), and (ii)
SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x).
Theorem 9: If a scoring rule S is proper, then SL(x,1) is decreasing and SL(x,0) is increasing
in [0,1]. If a scoring rule S is strictly proper, then SL(x,1) is strictly decreasing and SL(x,0) is
strictly increasing in [0,1].
2.8.2 Main results used in this paper from Predd et al., (2009)
Assumptions: Let S ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞] be a strictly proper, continuous scoring rule,
where the value ∞ is only allowed to be assigned to the end pints SL(0,1) and SL(1,0). They
actually also assume Additivity. The definition of Dominance in (59) is a little di↵erent from what
has been stated in this paper, which is stated as:
Definition: c weakly dominates c′ with respect to a rational scoring rule SG i↵ ∀w ∈ ⌦ ￿→
SG(C ′,w) ≤ SG(c,w).
The main results involved in this paper are:
Theorem 1: (a).(∀c ∉  P)(∃p ∈  P)(∀w ∈ ⌦)(SG(p,w) < SG(c,w)); and, (b).(∀p ∈  P)(￿c ∈
 C)(∀w ∈ ⌦)(SG(c,w) ≤ SG(p,w)).
Proposition 2: If S is strictly proper and continuous, then EU(x) = −xSL(x,1) − (1 − x)SL(x,0),
with (i)SL(x,1) = −EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x) and (ii) SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x), is di↵erentiable
at each point in (0,1). And, if EU(x), as defined as above, is strictly convex and di↵erentiable at
each point in (0,1) and SL is continuous, then SL is strictly proper.
To combine Gneiting & Raftery theorem and Proposition 2, we get Theorem 6.
2.9 Appendix III Proofs of the theorems
Below are the proof of the theorems that I present in the main body:
Theorem 3. SG is strictly proper i↵ the underlying local scoring rule SL is strictly proper.
Proof : To prove the ‘i↵’, we firstly prove the ‘if’ part, then we prove the ‘only if’ part.
First, we prove that if SG ∶  C × ⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly proper then the local scoring rule
SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) that underlies it is strictly proper. Let ⌦ = {w1,w2} and let us
abuse the notation and ignore {} and make X = {w1,w2}. Let wn be true in wn. Then we
know ∀p ∈  P, we have p(w1) + p(w2) = 1. Let p(w1) = x, then p(w2) = 1 − x. Let c(w1) = y
and c(w2) = 1 − x and x ≠ y. So, p ≠ c. Since SG ∶  C × ⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly proper, we have
∀p ∈ P, c ∈ C,p ≠ c ∶ ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) < ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(c,w). Recall that we assume Additivity,
such that SG(c,w) = ∑X∈X SL(c(X), vw(X)). We know:
(i)∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) = x[SL(x,1)+SL(1−x,0)]+(1−x)[SL(x,0)+SL(1−x,1)] = [xSL(x,1)+
(1 − x)SL(x,0)] + [xSL(1 − x,0) + (1 − x)SL(1 − x,1)] and,
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(ii)∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(c,w) = x[SL(y,1)+SL(1−x,0)]+(1−x)[SL(y,0)+SL(1−x,1)] = [xSL(y,1)+
(1 − x)SL(y,0)] + [xSL(1 − x,0) + (1 − x)SL(1 − x,1)].
By combining (i) and (ii), we get xSL(x,1) + (1 − x)SL(x,0) < xSL(y,1) + (1 − x)SL(y,0) as
required. So, we get the ‘if’ part.
Second, we prove that if the local scoring rule SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly proper,
then the global scoring rule SG ∶  C × ⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) that is aggregated by it is strictly proper. let
￿E￿ be the cardinality of set E. We know that 0 < ￿⌦￿ = n <∞ where n ∈ N and N represents the set
of natural numbers, since we assume that there are finite possible worlds in ⌦. So, ￿X ￿ ∈ N < ∞.
Since X is a partition, then a proposition is either true or false at a possible world. Let wn be the
set of possible worlds that makes the proposition wn true. Let us index all the possible worlds w
in ⌦ as w1,w2, ...,wn in this way. Let us abuse the notation and denote wn as the proposition that
is true at wn, too. Since these possible worlds are mutually exclusive, by Additivity, we get:
∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) = p(w1) × [SL(p(w1),1) + SL(p(w2),0) + ... + SL(p(wn,0)] + p(w2) ×
[SL(p(w1),0) + SL(p(w2),1) + ... + SL(p(wn,0)] + ... + p(wn) × [SL(p(w1),0) + SL(p(w2),0)... +
SL(p(wn),1)] <∞. (Each part is finite and we have finite parts.)
We unit similar terms and get:
∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) = {p(w1)×SL(p(w1),1)+[(1−p(w1)]×SL(p(w1),0)}+{p(w2)×SL(p(w2),1)+
[(1 − p(w2)] × SL(p(w2),0)} + ... + {p(wn) × SL(p(wn),1) + [(1 − p(wn)]} <∞.
Note that each cell of {} is actually of the form xSL(x,1) + (1 − x)SL(x,0). (For example,
{p(w1) × SL(p(w1),1) + [(1 − p(w1)] × SL(p(w1),0)}.)
Now suppose another credence function c ≠ p, we know that:
∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(c,w) = {p(w1)×SL(c(w1),1)+[(1−p(w1)]×SL(c(w1),0)}+{p(w2)×SL(c(w2),1)+
[(1 − p(w2)] × SL(c(w2),0)} + ... + {p(wn) × SL(c(wn),1) + [(1 − p(wn)]} <∞.
Note that each cell of {} is actually of the form xSL(y,1)+ (1−x)SL(y,0), and since c ≠ p, we
know that sometimes x ≠ y.
Since SL is strictly proper, we have ∀x, y ∈ [0,1], x ≠ y ∶ xSL(x,1)+(1−x)SL(x,0) < xSL(y,1)+
(1−x)SL(y,0). So, each cell of ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(c,w) is no less, and sometimes greater, than each cell
of ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w). Then it is not hard to see that ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(p,w) < ∑w∈⌦ p(w)SG(c,w) as
required. So, we get the ‘only if’ part.
To combine, we complete the proof. ￿
Theorem 12. Let S be continuous and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. If S is strictly proper,
then S cannot make any non-probabilistic credence function strictly Immodest: it can make all and
only probability functions strictly Immodest.
Proof : It is easy to get this theorem based on Theorem 1 in Predd et al., (2009).
First, we prove that it can make only probability functions strictly Immodest. We prove it
by reductio. Suppose S is strictly proper, continuous and real-valued and satisfies both Addi-
tivity, and suppose c ∉  P and S makes c strictly Immodest. That means, ∀c′ ∈  C, c ≠ c′ ∶
∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c,w) < ∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w). However, this contradicts with (a) of on Theorem 1 in
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Predd et al., (2009): (a).(∀c ∉  P)(∃p ∈  P)(∀w ∈ ⌦)(SG(p,w) < SG(c,w)), since we can always
find a p ∈  P&p ≠ c, such that ∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(p,w) < SG(c,w). Hence, our assumption cannot be
true. So if S is strictly proper, continuous and real-valued and satisfies both Additivity, then S
can make only probability functions strictly Immodest.
The all part is very easy to proof based on (b).(∀p ∈  P)(￿c ∈  C)(∀w ∈ ⌦)(SG(c,w) ≤
SG(p,w)). Since no credence function can even weakly dominates any probability function p, p is,
no doubt, strictly Immodest with respect to SG.
Thus we complete our proof. ￿
Theorem 15. Let S be continuous and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. If S is strictly proper,
then S cannot make any non-probabilistic credence function Dominance Admissible or Immodest.
Proof : It is easy to get this theorem based on Theorem 1 in Predd et al., (2009). We prove it
by reductio. Suppose S is strictly proper, continuous and real-valued and satisfies both Additivity.
First, suppose c ∉  P and S makes c Dominance Admissible. And this conflicts with (a) of
Theorem 1 in Predd et al., (2009).
Second, suppose c ∉  P and S makes c Immodest. That means, ∀c′ ∈  C ∶
∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c,w) ≤ ∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w). However, this contradicts with (a) of on Theorem 1 in
Predd et al., (2009): (a).(∀c ∉  P)(∃p ∈  P)(∀w ∈ ⌦)(SG(p,w) < SG(c,w)), since we can always
find a p ∈ P&p ≠ c, such that ∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(p,w) < SG(c,w).
To combine, our assumptions cannot be true. So we get the conclusion that if S is
strictly proper, continuous and real-valued and satisfies Additivity, then S cannot make any non-
probabilistic credence functions Dominance Admissible/Immodest.
Thus we complete our proof. ￿
Theorem 18. The global scoring rule SG is strictly Truth-Directed i↵ the underlying local scoring
rule SL is strictly Truth-Directed.
Proof : To prove the ‘i↵’, we firstly prove the ‘if’ part, then we prove the ‘only if’ part.
Firstly, we prove that if SG ∶  C ×⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly Truth-Directed then the underlying
local scoring rule SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) that aggregates it is strictly Truth-Directed. Let
⌦ = {w1,w2} and let us abuse the notation and ignore {} and make X = {w1,w2}. Let wn be true
in wn. Let p(w1) = x&p(w2) = 1−x and c(w1) = y&c(w2) = 1−x. Recall that we assume Additivity,
such that: SG(c,w) = ∑X∈X SL(c(X), vw(X)). So we have:
(i)SG(p,w1) = SL(x,1) + SL(1 − x,0) and, SG(p,w2) = SL(x,0) + SL(1 − x,1);
(ii)SG(c,w1) = SL(y,1) + SL(1 − x,0) and, SG(c,w2) = SL(y,0) + SL(1 − x,1).
We know if x < y, then according to the definition of strict Truth-Directedness, SG(p,w1) >
SG(c,w1), and SG(p,w2) < SG(c,w2). Uniting (i) and (ii) we get (i)SL(x,0) < SL(y,0) and
(ii)SL(x,1) > SL(y,1) as required. So, we get the ‘if’ part.
Secondly, we prove that if the local scoring rule SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly Truth-
Directed, then the global scoring rule SG ∶  C × ⌦ ￿→ [0,∞) that is aggregated by it is strictly
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Truth-Directed. From the proof of Theorem 3, we have equations:
SG(c,w1) = SL(c(w1),1) + SL(c(w2),0) + ... + SL(c(wn),0) <∞;
SG(c,w2) = SL(c(w1),0) + SL(c(w2),1) + ... + SL(c(wn),0) <∞;
... and
SG(c,wn) = SL(c(w1),0) + SL(c(w2),0) + ... + SL(c(wn),1) <∞.
Also, suppose another credence function c′, c′ ≠ c. It can be represented of the same form —
just change c into c′. So, for each n, we have equation: SG(c′,wn) = SL(c′(w1),0)+SL(c′(w2),0)+
... + SL(c′(wn),1) <∞.
Since SL ∶ [0,1] × {0,1} ￿→ [0,∞) is strictly Truth-Directed, we have ∀x, y ∈ [0,1], x < y ∶
(i)SL(x,0) < SL(y,0); (ii)SL(x,1) > SL(y,1). So, each component of the above equation will be
no greater, and sometimes smaller, if c(wn) is uniformly closer, and sometimes strictly closer, to
the the truth value in wn, than c
′(wn). It follows that the sum SG(c′,wn) > SG(c,wn). Hence, we
get the ‘only if’ part.
To combine, we complete the proof. ￿
Theorem 21. Let S be continuous and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. If we assume that both
SL(x,0) and SL(x,0) are linear, then neither SL nor SG is strictly proper.
Proof : We prove it by reductio. Assume that both SL(x,0) and SL(x,0) are linear, they
must be: (i) SL(x,1) = ax + b,a, b ∈ R; and (i) SL(x,0) = cx + d, c,d ∈ R. Suppose that SL or SG is
strictly proper, because Theorem 3, we only consider the case for SL. According to Theorem 6, we
must have:
(i)EU(x) = −xSL(x,1) − (1 − x)SL(x,0) and it is strictly convex,
(ii)SL(x,1) = −EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x);
(iii)SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x).
However, the above three conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously.
From (i), we know that EU(x) = (c − a)x2 + (d − b − c)x − d and it is strictly convex.
From (ii), we know SL(x,1) = (c+3a)x2 +2a+3c−d)x+ b+ c−2d. To make it linear, c+3a = 0;
From (iii), we know that SL(x,0) = cx2 − 2(d − b − c)x + d. So, to make it linear, c = 0.
Henceforth, c = a = 0 and EU(x) = (d − b)x − d. EU (x) in this form cannot be strictly
convex. So we’ve got a contradiction, and our assumption is therefore false: neither SL nor SG is
strictly proper.
Thus, we complete the proof. ￿
Theorem 22. Let S be strictly proper and real-valued, and satisfy Additivity. SL(x,0) and SL(x,1)
should be continuous at all but countably many points.
Proof : It is easy to get this based on the monotonicity of SL(x,0) and SL(x,0). Accord-
ing to Theorem 9, both SL(x,0) and SL(x,0) are strictly monotonic. Then, because monotonic
function can only be discontinuous at most countably many points, both SL(x,0) and SL(x,0) are
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continuous at all but countably many points (63). So, we get the proof that SL(x,0) and SL(x,0)
should be continuous at all but countably many points. ￿
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3 Strictly proper scoring rules for imprecise credences
3.1 Background
In this chapter, we discuss scoring rules for imprecise credences. As a starting point for our
discussions, let us begin by introducing some background.
Both precise credences and imprecise credences are ways of modeling a rational agent’s epis-
temic states. In the context of precise credences, a rational agent is supposed to adopt a credence
to a proposition, or a credence function, which is a function that assigns credences to a set of
propositions, to model his epistemic state. And in the context of imprecise credences, a rational
agent is supposed to adopt a set of credences to a proposition, or a set of credence functions, each
of which assigns a set of credences to the given set of propositions, to model his epistemic state.40
Let us also recall Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT). As described in the previous chapter,
normative epistemologists employ EpDT to defend a host of epistemic norms. Obviously, whether
an agent adopts precise or imprecise credences, he should obey some epistemic norms, both for
prior beliefs and for updating. Significant progress in defending epistemic norms has been made
by applying EpDT to precise credences in recent years (29; 30; 58; 53; 54; 55; 56; 6). To reiterate,
the structure of an EpDT argument in favor of an epistemic norm is as follows (57):
(i) We assume that a legitimate scoring rule for measuring the epistemic disutility should have
a set of mathematical properties.
(ii) We use a decision rule to decide which credence function is irrational with respect to a
legitimate scoring rule.
(iii) We get amathematical theorem, which shows that it is necessary to obey a certain epistemic
norm to avoid being irrational in the sense of (ii).
(iv) Conclusion: a rational agent should obey a certain epistemic norm.
We are now ready for the subject of this chapter. In this chapter, we discuss legitimate scoring
rules for imprecise credences. In particular, we focus on characterizing scoring rules for imprecise
credences.41 Normally, when we apply EpDT to precise credences, we assume that a legitimate
scoring rule should be strictly proper, continuous and real-valued. But this becomes a problem if
we want to apply EpDT to imprecise credences. (71; 45) both show that, unlike in the case of
precise credences, it is impossible to have a strictly proper, continuous and real-valued scoring rule
for imprecise credences. In other words, if we assume that a legitimate scoring rule for imprecise
credences should be strictly proper, continuous and real-valued, too, then we have no legitimate
scoring rule for imprecise credences at all.
The Impossibility Result reveals that the three properties - strict propriety, continuity and
40The literature on imprecise credences is vast, and there are di↵erent models and interpretations of imprecise
credences (77; 78; 30; 5). In this chapter, as usually done in the literature, precise credences are treated as special
cases of imprecise credences, where the set in question reduces to a singleton.
41Unlike what has been presented in (56), which does the characterization work in the context of precise credences,
I do not o↵er any rationales for the mathematical properties I am going to assume in this chapter, except for those
that are unusual. There are two reasons for doing so: (i) to o↵er rationales for these properties is a much more
substantial undertaking than I can handle in this thesis; (ii) there is very little research on scoring rules for imprecise
credences, so providing characterizations without rationales is probably a worthwhile project already.
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being real-valued - are jointly inconsistent in the context of imprecise credences. In order to have
a legitimate scoring rule to apply EpDT to imprecise credences, we have to drop at least one
of the three properties. So, we have to answer the following question: Which property should
be dropped for imprecise credences? The question is important since we need a scoring rule to
apply EpDT to defend norms for imprecise credences. In these years, the issues of how we should
assign a prior and how we should update when we adopt imprecise credences, are fiercely debated
(20; 78; 61; 10; 26; 5). EpDT can no doubt have bearings on both issues.
One option is to drop strict propriety. Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler argue that, for imprecise
credences, we should drop strict propriety and we should instead adopt mild propriety (45). They
show that, in the case that an agent assigns credences to only one proposition, we can have a
legitimate scoring rule that assigns the same score to a set of credences as it does to a precise
credence no matter what the truth value is. Their result is limited in the sense that there is only
one proposition to which an agent assigns credences. In this chapter, I will o↵er a more general
conclusion concerning the case in which an agent assigns credences to finitely many propositions
based on the assumptions in (45; 2). Then I will present two results based on this conclusion.
However, my aim is not to defend this proposal. On the contrary, I o↵er these results in order to
argue against the proposal. Specifically, I will use these results to show that this proposal cannot
help solve a variety of issues in the context of imprecise credences. Since this proposal is not useful
for addressing these issues, we should look for other options.42
Dropping continuity seems to be another option. But based on the work in (45; 67), I will show
that if we want to save the existing progress in EpDT, then dropping continuity is unacceptable.
So the only option left is to drop the property of being real-valued. (71) drops this property.
This thesis follows suit. (45; 68; 2) all argue that dropping the property of being real-valued leads
to unacceptable results. I will respond to these objections by showing that some objections are not
quite right, while others can be easily resolved.
Last but not least, I will o↵er the general forms of two kinds of strictly proper, continuous and
lexicographic scoring rules. (71) o↵ers an example of Brier-styled lexicographic scoring rule, but
this will not satisfy those who want to adopt a Log-styled or a Spherical-styled scoring rule. The
general forms of scoring rules can help them generate some scoring rules easily that are tailored to
their needs.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 o↵ers the definition of  −strict propriety.
Section 3.3 o↵ers the definitions of strict propriety and of continuity in the context of imprecise
credences, and then it illustrates the Impossibility Result in (71; 45). Section 3.4 discusses the
problems we face if we adopt the so-called mild propriety proposal or we drop continuity. Then
it responds to (45; 68; 2). Section 3.5 characterizes two kinds of strictly proper scoring rules for
imprecise credences. Section 3.6 concludes. The related literature is summarized in Appendix I.
42Dropping both strict propriety and mild propriety will not be discussed in the main text. (32; 33) argue that
we should do so. But (68; 2) show that this proposal leads to the result that some sets of probabilistic credence
functions are dominated, and this result is unacceptable. I agree with them. More discussion on this improper
scoring rule can be found in Appendix II.
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Appendix II addresses the issue of justifying Probabilism for imprecise credences using the existing
scoring rules. Proofs of the theorems are presented in Appendix III.
3.2  −strict propriety for imprecise credences
Relatively little research has been done on scoring rules for imprecise credences. Paying a
closer attention to them, we find that we do not really have a precise definition of strict propriety
in the context of imprecise credences. And since strict propriety is essential for our discussion, let
us start our discussion by defining strict propriety for imprecise credences. To do so, we can get
some idea from the definition of strict propriety for precise credences.
For precise credences, the definition of strict propriety covers three aspects. First, it requires
that all probability functions get the unique best. Second, it only compares the credence functions
that are in the domain of a scoring rule (since otherwise at least one of them is undefined). In other
words, a scoring rule is strictly proper relative to its domain. Third, a probability function is the
unique best in the sense that it gets the unique minimum expected score by its own light. That
means, it is strictly proper with respect to the decision rule Maximum Expected Utility (MEU).43
Similarly, for imprecise credences, we can o↵er the definition of strict propriety by covering
the following three aspects:
(i) The definition of strict propriety for imprecise credences requires that all sets of probabilistic
credence functions get the unique best.
(ii) A scoring rule is strictly proper relative to the domain of imprecise credences.
(iii) It is strictly proper with respect to  , where   is a decision rule using imprecise credences.
For example, we can define   −Maximin−strictly proper for imprecise credecences, as Seidenfeld et
al. have done in (71).
Formally, let ⌦ be a fixed, non-empty and finite set of all possible worlds and let w denote a
generic possible world. Let X be a partition over ⌦. Let X1,X2, ...,Xn be propositions in X , such
that at each possible world exactly one proposition Xn is true. Let c be a credence function that
assigns to each proposition Xn in X a number in [0, 1], that is, c : X ￿→ [0, 1]. Let C be a set of
credence functions c on X and let C (X ) be a set of credences that are assigned by all the credence
functions c in C to X, that is, C(X) = {c(X)￿c ∈ C}. Let P be a set of probabilistic credence
functions p on X and let P(X ) be a set of credences assigned to X by all the probabilistic credence
functions p in P, that is, P(X) = {p(X)￿p ∈ P}. Let  C be the set of all credence functions c on X ,
and let  P be the set of all credence functions p on X . Let P(E) represents the power set of set E.
So, P( C) consists of all sets of credence functions on X , P( P) consists all sets of probabilistic
credence functions on X . Throughout our discussion, for simplicity, we will only discuss the sets
that are closed and convex. The definitions go as follows: A set D ⊆ Rn is closed i↵ it contains
all its limit points. And we say a point x ∈ D is a limit point of D if every neighbourhood of x
contains at least one point of D di↵erent from x itself. Besides, we say a set D ⊆ Rn is convex i↵
43Recall that a score is a disutility measure. Hence, smaller expected score means greater expected utility. The
basic idea of this paragraph came from (71).
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∀x1, x2 ∈D,∀  ∈ [0,1] ∶  x1 + (1 −  )x2 ∈D. Furthermore, we abuse the notation and use P(E) to
denote the set of all closed and convex subsets of E. Readers should notice that our results do not
necessarily apply to those sets that are not closed or convex.44
Let vw be a characteristic function such that vw(X ) = 1 if X is true at world w (w ∈ X ) and
vw(X ) = 0 otherwise (w ∉ X ).
Let S be a scoring rule. Since we are dealing with imprecise credences, the domain of the
local scoring rule SL is P([0,1]), and the domain of the global scoring rule SG is P( C). If we
assume S to be real-valued, we have SL ∶ P([0,1]) × {0,1} ￿→ R as a real-valued local scoring
rule that assigns real-valued score to each set of credences for vw(X ) = 1/0 at world w (R is the
set of real numbers). Similarly, SG: P( C ) × ⌦ ￿→ R is a real-valued global scoring rule that
assigns a real-valued score to each set of credence functions at world w. We use SL(C(X), vw(X))
to denote the local score of C(X) when w is actual. And we use SG(C,w) to denote the global
score of C when w is actual. Besides, throughout our discussion, we assume: ∀c(X) ∈ [0,1] ∶
SL(c(X), vw(X)) = SL({c(X)}, vw(X)), and, ∀c ∈  C ∶ SG(c,w) = SG({c},w). So, a score for a
precise credence is treated as a special case, in which C(X) = {c(X)} or C = {c} is a singleton.
We do not assume a relationship between the local scoring rule and the global scoring rule now.
We will do it in Section 3.4.
We still need to define what the decision rule is. We borrow some formalism from statisticians
(51; 65; 1) and the definition goes as follows:
Definition 24. A decision rule   for imprecise credences is a map from a pair of a SL and C(X)
to a set of C ′(X), that is,  (SL, C(X)) = {C ′(X)￿C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1])}; or a map from a pair of SG
and C to a set of C ′, that is,  (SG, C) = {C ′￿C ′ ∈ P( C)}.45
Example 25.  MEU is inapplicable in the context of imprecise credences. Here we o↵er the
definition of it with respect to the domain of precise credences. The definition of  MEU for precise
credences goes as follows:
(i) MEU(SL, x) = {y ∈ [0,1] ∶ (∀z ∈ [0,1])[−xSL(y,1) − (1 − x)SL(y,0) ≥ −xSL(z,1) − (1 −
x)SL(z,0)]}, and,
(ii) MEU(SG, c) = {c′ ∈ C ∶ (∀c′′ ∈ C)[−∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′,w) ≥ −∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(c′′,w)]}.
The definition of  -strict propriety/ -propriety in the context of imprecise credences goes as
follows:
Definition 26. A local scoring rule for imprecise credences SL is  −proper if ∀P (X) ∈ P([0,1]) ∶
P (X) ∈  (SL, P (X)). It is  −strictly proper if ∀P (X) ∈ P([0,1]) ∶ {P (X)} =  (SL, P (X)).
Similarly, a global scoring rule for imprecise credences SG is  −proper if ∀P ∈ P( P) ∶ P ∈
 (SG, P ). It is  −strictly proper if ∀P ∈ P( P) ∶ {P} =  (SG, P ). We say a scoring rule is
 −mildly proper if it is  −proper but not  −strictly proper.
44As shown in (77; 1), this setup is in fact pretty general, which is mathematically equivalent to a varieties of
imprecise probabilities models, such as partial preference ordering, coherent lower probabilities and lower previsions,
and can include other models as special cases, such as belief function and possibility theory. Consequently, our
discussion here applies to these models.
45Similar ideas has been expressed in (45), in which they call the output set ‘rational belief set’.
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Note that a scoring rule is  -strictly proper or not relative to its domain. In the definition
o↵ered in this chapter, we discuss  -strict propriety for imprecise credences. So the domain in the
definition is the set of all (closed and convex) sets of credences, or the set of all (closed and convex)
sets of credence functions. And the domain of scoring rules for precise credences is just a (proper)
subset of the general domain for imprecise credences. This fact has two immediate implications:
(i) some  −strictly proper scoring rules with respect to the domain of precise credences may no
longer be  −strictly proper with respect to the domain of imprecise credences; (ii) a scoring rule for
imprecise credences that is  -strictly proper will also be  -strictly proper with respect to the domain
of precise credences. For example, Brier scoring Sbrier is not an  MEU -strictly proper scoring rule
for imprecise credences (it is not even well-defined for imprecise credences in general), but what we
will define in the coming sections remains to be  -strictly proper even if one only adopts precise
credences. This is a good result, since within this framework we can treat the model of imprecise
credences as a generalization of, instead of a rival to, the model of precise credences.
It is also worth noticing that we define strict propriety with respect to a certain decision rule
 . As you know, SBrier is  MEU -strictly proper given the domain of precise credences. However,
if we move to other decision rules, such as what we call ‘arbitrary decision rule’  arbitrary, SBrier
may not be  arbitrary-strictly proper even if the domain keeps the same. This relativity to decision
rules has more interesting implications waiting to be explored.
3.3 The Impossibility Result
Seidenfeld et al. and Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler both show that it is impossible to have a strictly
proper, continuous and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise credences (71; 45). In this section, we
will illustrate the Impossibility Result.
The reader may have noticed that we still haven’t defined strict propriety - we only defined
 -strict propriety. But the Impossibility Result is expressed in terms of strictly proper. Further-
more, we haven’t defined continuity for imprecise credences, either. Without definitions of strict
propriety and of continuity for imprecise credences, we cannot precisely state the Impossibility
Result. Therefore, in this section, I will, first, o↵er definitions of strict propriety and of continuity
for imprecise credences, and then will illustrate the Impossibility Result.
3.3.1 Strict propriety and Admissibility
To get the definition of strict propriety, let us introduce a constraint on decision rules: we will
require these decision rules to respect Admissibility. Based on this constraint, roughly, we will say
that a scoring rule S is strictly proper if there exists a decision rule   that respects Admissibility such
that S is  -strictly proper. Consider the example below to get an intuition on why this constraint
is important.
Example 27. Suppose we have a decision rule  strange (partially) defined as:
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(i)∀P (X) ∈ P([0,1]),∀SL ∶  strange(SL, P (X)) = {P (X)}, and
(ii)∀P ∈ P( P ),∀SG ∶  strange(SG, P ) = {P}.
Obviously, according to the (partial) definition of  strange, all scoring rules whatsoever are
 strange strictly proper. Relative to  strange, any real-valued and continuous scoring rule is also a
strictly proper, real-valued and continuous scoring rules for imprecise credences. Then the impos-
sibility will not hold if such a decision rule is allowed. However, as the name of this decision rule
indicates, it is too strange to be adopted by a rational agent. There are good reasons to disregard
this decision rule.
Let DA denote a set of decision rules from which we might choose. This example shows that
we should make some constraint on DA to rule out decision rules like  strange. Following (71; 45),
we put the following constraint on DA: only decision rules that respect Admissibility can be a
member of DA.
Definition 28. We say a decision rule   respects Admissibility, namely,   ∈ DA, if it satisfies
two conditions:46
(i)∀C ′′(X) ∈ P([0,1]) such that if
a.SL(C(X),0) ≤ SL(C ′(X),0); b.SL(C(X),1) ≤ SL(C ′(X),1); c.C ′(X) ∈  (SL, C ′′(X)),
then we have C(X) ∈  (SL, C ′′(X));
(ii)∀C ′′ ∈ P( C) such that if
a.∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C,w) ≤ SG(C ′,w); b.C ′ ∈  (SG, C ′′),
then we have C ∈  (SG, C ′′).
In words, the definition imposes two requirements on a decision rule. First, if C(X) gets no
greater score than C ′(X) whatever the truth value of X is with respect to a legitimate local scoring
rule SL, then if C
′(X) is picked by the decision rule with respect to SL, C(X) should be picked
by this decision rule with respect to SL, too. Second, if C gets no greater score than C
′ at every
possible world w with respect to a legitimate global scoring rule SG, then if C
′ is picked by the
decision rule with respect to SG, C should be picked by this decision rule with respect to SG, too.
This constraint is very intuitive, and it should be counted as a basic constraint on the set of
decision rules from which we might choose. We will introduce another constraint when we discuss
the proposal of dropping continuity in Section 3.4.2.
Now we are ready for the definition of strict propriety. The definition goes as follows:
Definition 29. A scoring rule S is (strictly) proper if it is  −(strictly) proper, for some
  ∈DA.
3.3.2 Defining continuity
Seidenfeld et al. o↵er no definition of continuity in the context of imprecise credences (71).
Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler and Konek present two di↵erent ways of understanding continuity for
46This version is the same as the version presented in (45), however, it is slightly stronger than the version
presented in (71).
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imprecise credences (45; 33). Let us discuss their proposals in this section.
Continuity is a notion based on distance. Normally, we discuss continuity based on a metric
space, within which we know the distance between any two members. Among all distance functions,
the Euclidean distance may be the most frequently adopted one. Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler’s pro-
posal does not make such a strong assumption. They only make a constraint on distance functions
that might be used to measure the distance between two sets of imprecise credences. The constraint
has been called ‘Constraint P’, where ‘P’ represents ‘Pareto’. Let d be a distance function and
let d(C(X), C ′(X)) be the distance between the two sets C(X) and C ′(X). Let C(X) be the
smallest value assigned to X by C, and let C(X) be the greatest value assigned to X by C. The
definition of Constraint P goes as follows:
Definition 30. We say a distance function d satisfies Constraint P if ∀C(X), C ′(X), C ′′(X) ∈
P([0,1]) ∶ [￿C(X) − C ′(X)￿ ≤ ￿C(X) − C ′′(X)￿]&[￿C(X) − C ′(X)￿ ≤ ￿C(X) − C ′′(X)￿] →
d(C(X), C ′(X)) ≤ d(C(X), C ′′(X)).
This is a very intuitive constraint on distance functions for imprecise credences. However, this
constraint is not strong enough, as under this constraint, some strange distance functions will be
allowed. For example, the so-called ‘discrete distance function’ ddis, which is normally defined as:
(i)ddis(C(X), C ′(X)) = 0, C(X) = C ′(X); and (ii)ddis(C(X), C ′(X)) = 1, C(X) ≠ C ′(X), will be
allowed, too.
Let us now present Konek’s idea. His idea is simple. First, for each set of credences C(X), we
represent it by its two endpoints (C(X), C(X)). For example, for the case of C(X) = [0.3,0.5],
we simply use the point (0.3,0.5) to represent it. Then, we use the Euclidean distance. It is easy
to conclude that all closed and convex sets of imprecise credences jointly form a plane (triangle)
and the distance function satisfies Constraint P.
In this thesis, I employ Konek’s idea. I do it for two reasons. First, the results in the context
of precise credences are based on the Euclidean distance, so employing this metric can help save
these results. Second, it is a pretty natural distance function. (Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler’s actually
use this distance function for their codomain, too.) Based on this, the definition of continuity goes
as follows:
Definition 31. We say that a global scoring rule SG is continuous if it is continuous at every
possible world w. We say a local scoring rule SL is continuous at point C(X) if ∀" > 0,∃  > 0,
such that if d(C(X), C ′(X)) <  , then we have ￿SL(C ′(X), vw(X))−SL(C(X), vw(X))￿ < ", where
d is the Euclidean distance. We say SL is continuous if it is continuous at every point in its domain.
3.3.3 The Impossibility Result and discussion
Now we are ready for the Impossibility Result:
Theorem 32 (Impossibility Result). [Seidenfeld et al. and Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler] If SL is a
scoring rule for imprecise credences that is both continuous and real-valued, then it impossible for
SL to be strictly proper.
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One might be interested in whether some specific decision rule respects Admissibility with
respect to a continuous and real-valued scoring rule. For example, for imprecise credences, normally,
we have   −Maximin,   −Maximax,  E−admissible,  Maximal,  Hurwicz and  Intervaldominance (1). The
answer is that they all respect Admissibility if S is a continuous and real-valued scoring rule for
imprecise credences. We o↵er the definitions of   −Maximin and   −Maximax below, and these two
decision rules will be discussed subsequently.
Roughly,   −Maximin says that an agent should choose the option(s) that have the greatest
minimum expected utility, and   −Maximax says that an agent should choose the option(s) that
have the greatest maximum expected utility. Other decision rules are left to Appendix I and will
not be discussed in the coming sections.
We have several notations:
E
C(X)[SL(C ′(X))] ∶= infx∈C(X)[−xSL(C ′(X),1) − (1 − x)SL(C ′(X),0)].
EC(X)[SL(C ′(X))] ∶= supx∈C(X)[−xSL(C ′(X),1) − (1 − x)SL(C ′(X),0)].
Similarly, E
C
[SG(C ′)] ∶= infc∈C[−∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(C ′,w)].
And, EC[SG(C ′)] ∶= supc∈C[−∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(C ′,w)].
We have the following definitions:
Definition 33 (  −Maximin). A decision rule   is   −Maximin if
(i)  −Maximin(SL, C(X)) =
{C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1]) ∶ [∀C ′′(X) ∈ P([0,1])][E
C(X)[SL(C ′(X))] ≥ EC(X)[SL(C ′′(X))]]},
(ii)  −Maximin(SG, C) = {C ′ ∈ P( C) ∶ [∀C ′′ ∈ P( C)][EC[SG(C ′)] ≥ EC[SG(C ′′)]]}.
Definition 34 (  −Maximax). A decision rule   is   −Maximax if
(i)  −Maximax(SL, C(X)) =
{C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1]) ∶ [∀C ′′(X) ∈ P([0,1])][EC(X)[SL(C ′(X))] ≥ EC(X)[SL(C ′′(X))]]},
(ii)  −Maximax(SG, C) = {C ′ ∈ P( C) ∶ [∀C ′′ ∈ P( C)][EC[SG(C ′)] ≥ EC[SG(C ′′)]]}.
Theorem 35. If S is a continuous and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise credences, then
all of   −Maximin,   −Maximin,  E−admissible,  Maximal,  Hurwicz and  Intervaldominance respect
Admissibility.
And, since all of these decision rules respect Admissibility, the above Impossibility Result
applies to all of them. That is, we cannot have any [ MEU or   −Maximin or   −Maximax or
 E−admissible or  Maximal or  Hurwicz or  Intervaldominance ]-strictly proper, real-valued and contin-
uous scoring rule.
Theorem 36. It is impossible to have a real-valued, continuous and [  −Maximin or   −Maximax
or  E−admissible or  Maximal or  Hurwicz or  Intervaldominance]-strictly proper local scoring rule SL
for imprecise credences.
This is pretty bad news, since these are commonly adopted decision rules for imprecise cre-
dences. And, to have a global scoring rule, we normally assume Additivity and use the sum of
the local scores as the global score. Without a local scoring rule, we cannot have a global scoring
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rule. One may wonder how we can respond to this Impossibility Result. A natural response is to
drop at least one of the three properties: strict propriety, continuity and the property of of being
real-valued. The next section investigates whether this might work.
3.4 Which property should we drop?
One of the three properties - strict propriety, continuity and being real-valued - must be
dropped to escape the Impossibility Result. Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler argue that we should drop
strict propriety (45) and they o↵er a mild propriety proposal. Seidenfeld et al., on the other hand,
drop the property of being real-valued and they o↵er an example of a strictly proper, continuous
and lexicographic scoring rule (71). No proposal of dropping continuity has been o↵ered. In this
section, I will investigate what will happen if we drop one of these properties. My conclusion is:
We should drop the property of being real-valued.
3.4.1 Dropping strict propriety
Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler argue that we should drop strict propriety and we should adopt mild
propriety (45). Their idea is: for each set of imprecise credences, a legitimate scoring rule will
assign to the set the same score as it does to a credence inside the set no matter what the truth
value is. They prove that, along with some assumptions, there exists such a legitimate scoring rule
in the case that an agent assigns credences to only one proposition.47 Let me present their work.
Based on this, I will o↵er some stronger conclusions and then argue against this proposal.
Again, Let ￿E￿ be the cardinality of set E. Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler discuss the case in which
￿X ￿ = 1. Let SL be a local scoring rule for imprecise credences. Let SG be a global scoring rule.
Here are seven requirements imposed on a legitimate local scoring rule: being real-valued,
continuity, Mild Immodesty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, Savage’s Omelet Law (SOL) and Mono-
tonicity. (I will not discuss these assumptions in detail, since most of them are quite intuitive and
plausible.)
(i) Being real-valued: SL ∶ P([0,1]) × {0,1}→ [0,∞).
(ii) Continuity: SL is continuous as defined in the above section.
48
(iii) Mild Immodesty*: SL is  -proper where   satisfies Nondominance constraint. Non-
dominance constraint says that a dominated option should not be pircked by a decision rule with
respect to SL. Here are the definitions:
Definition 37. Here is the relevant definition of dominance:
47Their expression is a little di↵erent from what will be presented. They actually show that if there is only one
proposition that an agent assigns credence to, then at every possible world, there exists a legitimate scoring rule that
assigns to a set of imprecise credences the same score as a precise one. The conclusion presented here is equivalent
to their conclusion with the following assumption: ∀C ∈ P( C),∀C(X) ∈ P([0,1]),∀w ∈ ⌦, if ￿X ￿ = 1, then we have
SG(C,w) = SL(C(X), vw(X)). We do not present their conclusion in their original way since we are treating the
local scoring rule and the global scoring rule di↵erently in this thesis and the basic idea of their conclusion is the
same as what has been presented here.
48Readers may notice that Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler allow a variety of metrics, while we adopt the Euclidean
distance. In fact, our results apply to any metric that induces a coarser topology than the Euclidean distance.
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(i).∀C ′′(X), C(X) ∈ P([0,1]), such that if SL(C(X),0) < SL(C ′(X),0) and SL(C(X),1) <
SL(C ′(X),1), then we say C(X) dominates C ′(X) with respect to SL.
(ii).∀C ′′, C ∈ P( C)), such that if ∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C,w) < SG(C ′,w), then we say C dominates
C
′ with respect to SG.
Definition 38. We say a decision rule   satisfies Nondominance If:
a.∀C ′′(X) ∈ P([0,1]), if ∃C(X) ∈ P([0,1]), such that C(X) dominates C ′(X) with respect
to SL, then we have C
′(X) ∉  (SL, C ′′(X));
b.∀C ′′ ∈ P( C), if ∃C ∈ P( C)), such that C dominates C ′ with respect to SG, then we have
C
′ ∉  (SL, C ′′).
(iv) Strict Truth-Directedness*: ∀C(X), C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1], if ∀x ∈ C(X),∀y ∈ C ′(X) ∶
￿x−vw(X)￿ < ￿y−vw(X)￿, then we have SL(C(X), vw(X)) < SL(C ′(X), vw(X)). The Strict Truth-
Directedness* assumption is a generalized version of Strict Truth-Directedness when we move to
imprecise credences.
(v) Savage’s Omelet Law (SOL): SL satisfies SOL. Let C
′(X)￿C(X) denote the set of
elements that are in C ′(X) but not in C(X), that is, C ′(X)￿C(X) = {x ∈ C ′(X)￿x ∉ C(X)}.
A scoring rule SL satisfies SOL if ∀C(X), C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1]), C(X) ⊆ C ′(X) such that if ∀y ∈
C
′(X)￿C(X),∀x ∈ C ∶ ￿x− vw(X)￿ < ￿y − vw(X)￿ then SL(C(X),w(X)) ≤ SL(C ′(X), vw(X)). This
assumption says that if C(X) is a subset of C ′(X), and every member in C ′(X) but not in C(X)
gets greater score than any member in C(X), then the score of C ′(X) is no less than the score of
C(X).
(vi) Monotonicity: SL satisfies Monotonicity. A scoring rule SL satisfies Monotonicity if
∀C(X), C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1]), C(X) ⊆ C ′(X), such that if ∀y ∈ C ′(X)￿C(X),∀x ∈ C ∶ ￿x − vw(X)￿ >
￿y − vw(X)￿, then SL(C(X),w(X)) ≥ SL(C ′(X), vw(X)). This assumption says that if C(X) is
a subset of C ′(X), and every member in C ′(X) but not in C(X) gets a smaller score than any
member in C(X), then the score of C ′(X) is no greater than the score of C(X).
(vii) Extensionality*: ∀w,w′ ∈ ⌦,∀C(X) ∈ P([0,1]), if vw(X) = v′w(X), then we have
SL(C(X), vw(X)) = SL(C(X), v′w(X)).
Theorem 39 (Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler). If SL satisfies the seven assumptions, namely being
real-valued, continuity, Mild Immodesty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, SOL, Monotonicity, Exten-
sionality*, then ∀C(X) ∈ P([0,1]),∃x ∈ C(X),∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SL(x, vw(X)) = SL(C(X), vw(X)).
In the light of the theorem above, in the context of imprecise credences, an agent still adopts
a strictly proper scoring rule that is  MEU−strictly proper with respect to the domain of precise
credences. And, to score a set of credeces, the agent simply selects one credence inside the set, and
let the score of the set be equal to the score of the credence, no matter what the truth value is.
Evidently, this is a mildly proper scoring rule with respect to the domain of imprecise credences,
and it is a strictly proper scoring rule with respect to the domain of precise credences.
The above result is quite limited, since it only discusses the case in which there is only one
proposition that an agent assigns credences to, which is uncommon in real life. Let us now turn to
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the more general cases in which there are more than one proposition that an agent assigns credences
to. To do so, we employ an assumption that has been advocated in (2) (slightly di↵erent version):
(viii) Local-Global Connection: Local-Global Connection builds a bridge between the local
scoring rule and the global scoring rule. It says that the global score of a set of credence functions
assigned by a global scoring rule should be on the basis of the score of each set of credences assigned
by a local scoring rule. This is a pretty weak assumption. By assuming it, I do not assume a specific
relationship between the local scoring rule and the global scoring rule. And I think it can be treated
as a starting point to generalize the work in (45).
Formally, this assumption says that a global scoring rule SG and its underlying local scor-
ing rule SL have the following connection: ∀C,C ′ ∈ P( C),∀w ∈ ⌦, such that if ∀X ∈ X ∶
SL(C(X), vw(X)) = SL(C ′(X), vw(X)), then we have SG(C,w) = SG(C ′,w).
Based on this new assumption, we get the theorem below:
Theorem 40. If SL satisfies the seven assumptions, namely being real-valued, continuity, Mild
Immodesty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, SOL, Monotonicity, Extensionality*, and SG and SL sat-
isfy Local-Global Connection, then ∀C ∈ P( C),∃c ∈  C ∶ [∀X ∈ X ∶ c(X) ∈ C(X)]&[∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶
SG(C,w) = SG(c,w)].
So, we can summarize the basic idea of the mild propriety proposal as: (i) for a set of imprecise
credences, it selects a credence inside the set, and then let the score of the credence be the score
of the set; (ii) for a set of credence functions, it selects a credence function, such that for each
proposition this credence function assigns a credence inside the credences interval assigned by the
set of credence functions, and, let the score of the credence function be the score of the set.
One thing worth noticing is, according to this proposal, a set of credence functions will always
get the same score not only as a precise one at every possible world, but also as an imprecise one
at every possible world. What is more, there will be infinitely many imprecise ones that get the
same score as the set of credence functions at every possible world. That is what the theorem
below says.
Theorem 41. If SL satisfies the seven assumptions, namely being real-valued, continuity, Mild
Immodesty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, SOL, Monotonicity, Extensionality*, and SG and SL sat-
isfy Local-Global Connection, then ∀C ∈ P( C), ￿C ￿ > 1,∃C ′ ∈ P( C), ￿C ′￿ > 1 ∶ [∀X ∈X ∶ C ′(X) ⊂
C(X)]&[∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C ′,w) = SG(C,w)]. Furthermore, there exists infinitely many such C ′ that
gets the same score as C at every possible world.49
Let us now turn to my criticism of the mild propriety proposal. The first problem with this
proposal is that we do not really have a scoring rule yet, since we still do not really know what
score each imprecise credences will get according to this proposal. To make the mild propriety
proposal complete, one has to know what x￿c we should select to represent the interval C(X)￿C.
In other words, one has to decide what the selection function is to make this proposal complete.
49We use ⊂ in the sense that A ⊂ B implies A ⊆ B and A ≠ B.
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There are also more serious problems faced by this proposal. Two facts of the above theorems
should be highlighted: (i) the score of a set of imprecise credences will always be the same as that
of a precise one at every possible world; (ii) the score of an imprecise one will always be the same
as some sets of imprecise credences at every possible world. These two facts raise a lot of problems.
First, if every set of imprecise credences will get the same score as a precise one at every
possible world, then there will be no reason o↵ered by EpDT that supports the adoption of any set
of imprecise credences over a precise one. Second, if every set of credence functions gets the same
score as another set of credence functions, then there will be no reason o↵ered by EpDT to support
update in some situation, which is obviously irrational sometimes. What is worse, if the vacuous
prior always get the same score as some subset of it, then EpDT cannot help solve one important
problem for imprecise credences - belief inertia. Further, if a set always get the same score as some
subset of it, then EpDT cannot help solve one important problem for imprecise credences - dilation.
These are all application issues that we will meet if we adopt the mild propriety proposal.
Here is an example for illustration, in which you decide to select the credence function that
assigns exactly the midpoint of the imprecise credences interval assigned by the set of credence
functions at every possible world to represent the score of the set of credence functions. We use
this selection function since this way of doing selection is pretty natural, and even if you choose
another selection function, you will be in similar situations as what we present in the example
below.
Example 42. Suppose that there is a coin in front of you. Let H denote the proposition that ‘The
coin will land Head on the next toss’ and let T denote the proposition that ‘The coin will land Tail
on the next toss’. Let us abuse the notation and also denote by H the possible world in which the
proposition H is true and T is false and let H the possible world in which the proposition H is
false and T is true. Let ⌦ = {H,T} be the set of possible worlds. Consider two cases:
(i) You face two options: a) an imprecise one C such that C = {p￿p(H) + p(T ) = 1} and b) a
precise one C ′ such that C ′ = {p(H) = p(T ) = 0.5};
(ii) You face two options: a) an imprecise one C such that C = {p￿p(H) ∈ [0.3,0.7]} and b) a
subset of C ′ such that C ′ = {p￿p(H) ∈ [0.5 − ",0.5 + "]}, where " is a very small positive number.
Clearly, we have C ′ ⊂ C.
We know in both cases the scores of the two choices are the same at every possible world.
The above example can help illustrate the issues I have mentioned in the above paragraph.
Here is the idea:
For case (i), we know that since the scores of C and C ′ are the same at every possible world,
then, with respect to any decision rule that respects Admissibility, whenever C ′ is the choice, C will
be a rational choice, too. So, we have no reason to prefer the imprecise one C to the precise one C ′,
according to this scoring rule. Furthermore, similar situations happen to every imprecise credences.
This cannot be accepted by the proponents of imprecise credences. At least, they will argue, in
some situation, a set of imprecise credences should be preferred, and this fact should be reflected
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by our scoring rules. And a scoring rule that cannot reflect this fact is therefore unreasonable.50
For case (ii), consider the case that an agent actually gets an evidence that the coin is very
likely to be fair, e.g., he tosses it for 1,000,000 times and gets 50,000 times head landed. So, based
on any plausible update, it is reasonable to require an agent to prefer C ′ to C. But, since the
scores of C and C ′ are the same at every possible world, then, with respect to any decision rule
that respects Admissibility, whenever C ′ is the choice, C is a rational choice, too. It follows that the
agent has no reason to move (update) from C to C ′ applying EpDT. This is very counter-intuitive,
and a scoring rule behaving in this way seems dubious.
Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler will respond to the above two objections by arguing that we should
prefer one that suits your evidential position better: you should prefer the one that is supported
by weightier evidence. I am not satisfied with this response, since by doing so they are actually
admitting that EpDT, with this mildly proper scoring rule, is useless in responding to both issues.
Rather, we should look aside and find other evidential reasons. This response is not satisfactory
for anyone who wants to investigate epistemic norms in the context of imprecise credences applying
EpDT. Besides, this response cannot respond to another two issues - belief inertia and dilation -
that I will address below.
First, let us consider the problem of belief inertia. Belief inertia, roughly, is a phenomenon
in which whatever evidence an agent gets, his posteriors remain the same as his prior. And it
has been shown that the belief inertia phenomenon occurs when an agent adopts the full set as
the prior and element-wise conditionalization as the update rule (77; 30; 61). The worry for this
phenomenon comes as one tends to think as our evidence increases, our credences interval should
shrink. However, this phenomenon defeats this hope. And this phenomenon cannot be resolved
based on the combination of the mild propriety proposal and the evidential reason. Why? This
is because, according to the mild propriety proposal, for case (i), the vacuous prior C gets the
same score as its subset C ′ at every possible world, so it is Admissible whenever the other one is a
choice. Besides, as even updated based on weight evidence, we still get the vacuous posterior C ,
it therefore cannot be defeated by evidence. Now, we are facing a problem: we do not have reason
o↵ered by EpDT to reject the vacuous C, and we do not have reason o↵ered by evidence to reject
the vacuous C after update, either. Then, for an agent, it is rationally permitted for him to adopt
the vacuous as the prior, and then get the vacuous as the posterior. So, measured with this scoring
rule, together with evidence consideration, the phenomenon of belief inertia is permitted.
For the problem of dilation, the situation is similar to the problem of belief inertia. Dilation
is a phenomenon in which an agent’s credences dilate necessarily no matter which evidence from a
partition one receives (77; 79; 31). Most authors consider dilation anomalous. But, according to
this proposal, some set gets the same score as its subset at every possible world, as shown by (i),
so we do not have reason o↵ered by EpDT or by evidence to forbid the dilating phenomenon from
occurring, either.51
50Shoenfield proposes a special case in which both C and p are probabilistic, and she argues that in this case an
agent violates the Principal Principle (68).
51Coincidently, (8) presents a similar concern and contends that this scoring rule permits dilation and contraction.
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In my view, if the mild propriety proposal makes EpDT inapplicable to these important issues
in the context of imprecise credenes, then it is a useless proposal both for the advocates of imprecise
credences and for the advocates of EpDT. Of course, it may still be reasonable even though it is
useless. However, if we can o↵er another seemingly reasonable proposal, which is potentially in
a better position to address the aforementioned issues, then we can at least forgo this proposal
for now and embrace the new one. My plan is that I am going to o↵er a new scoring rule in this
chapter, so for me, I argue that we should reject this proposal, at least for now. And since there
exists no more proposal of dropping strict propriety, we can set aside this option and turn our eyes
to the other two options, namely dropping continuity or dropping the property of being real-valued.
3.4.2 Dropping continuity
Mayo-Wilson & Wheerler o↵er a reason for rejecting the proposal of dropping continuity. They
argue that dropping continuity leads to strange scoring rules according the theorem below:
Theorem 43 (Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler). A strictly proper and real-valued scoring rule for impre-
cise credence is discontinuous almost everywhere.
Mayo-Wilson & Wheerler argue that a scoring rule that is discontinuous almost everywhere is
too strange to be acceptable. I agree with their idea. But this objection seems not to be decisive,
since though a scoring rule that is discontinuous almost everywhere seems strange, it does not
mean that it is not a reasonable scoring rule. For example, for those who want to have a legitimate
scoring rule that jumps almost everywhere, there seems to be nothing irrational about them.
I would like to raise another problem faced by the proposal of dropping continuity. The
problem is: if we want to save the progress that we have achieved by applying EpDT to precise
credences, the proposal of dropping continuity leads to conflicts with two plausible constraints on
scoring rules – it conflicts with Strict Truth-Directedness* and it conflicts with the combination of
SOL and Monotonicity.
Seidenfeld et al. in (71) set a constraint on decision rules: they contend that we should adopt
a decision rule that can be reduced to  MEU when our set of credences (credence functions) is a
singleton. The reason for this is simple: when we have only a singleton, we are in fact having
precise credences. And, as said in the first section of this chapter, we adopt  MEU -strictly proper
scoring rule for precise credences. Hence, if we want to save what we have achieved in the context
of precise credences, it is necessary for us to adopt a decision rule that can be reduced to  MEU for
imprecise credences. Besides, following (2), I think we should accept Joycean Constraint for saving
the progress that we have made:
Joycean Constraint: ∀c ∉ P,∃p ∈ P ∶ p dominates c with respect to SG.
Notice that Joycean Constraint is a part of the mathematical theorem that we use for defending
Probabilism (59; 30). So this assumption, though seems to be an ad hoc one, is hard to be rejected
I agree.
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by normative epistemologists if they want to save the existing progress. Besides, as stated in the
above chapter, we assume Additivity with respect to the domain of precise credences as usual.
So, we have the several constraints on scoring rules to save what we have already achieved
by applying EpDT to precise credences. However, the theorem below shows that if we accept
these constraints, there will be no legitimate scoring rule that also satisfies either Strict Truth-
Directedness* or the combination of SOL and Monotonicity.
Theorem 44.
(i) It is impossible to have a  -strictly proper and real-valued local scoring rule for imprecise cre-
dences that satisfies Additivity, Joycean Constraint and Strict Truth-Directedness*, where   ∈ DA
can be reduced to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)} or C = {c} is a singleton.
(ii) It is impossible to have a  -strictly proper and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise credences
that satisfies Additivity, Joycean Constraint, SOL and Monotonicity, where   ∈ DA can be reduced
to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)} or C = {c} is a singleton.
Based on the theorem above, we know that even if we can have a discontinuous strictly proper
scoring rule, it is a scoring rule that is intuitively unreasonable, because it will violate Strict Truth-
Directedness* and the combination of SOL and Monotonicity. Therefore, the proposal of dropping
continuity is unacceptable.52
3.4.3 Dropping the property of being real-valued
Seidenfeld et al. drop the property of being real-valued and they o↵er an example of a strictly
proper, continuous and lexicographic scoring rule. (45; 68; 2) all o↵er their reasons against the
proposal of dropping the property of being real-valued. In this section, I will respond to the
objections raised by them.
First, let us examine the objection in (68). Shoenfield in (68) argues against dropping the
property of being real-valued based on the following reasoning: if we accept CDA* and Strong
Extensionality*, and let our ￿X ￿ = 2, then each set of probabilistic credences centered at 0.5 will
get no smaller score than a probability function that assigns 0.5 to both propositions with respect
to a legitimate scoring rule, no matter how the world turns out to be. Then, Shoenfield argues,
there will be no reason for preferring the imprecise ones that are centered at 0.5 to the precise one.
Here are some definitions:
Coherent Dominance Admissiblity* (CDA*):∀P ∈ P( P ),￿C ∈ P( C) ∶ C gets no
greater and sometimes smaller score than P at every possible world with respect to SG. CDA* is
a generalized version of CDA when we move to imprecise credences.
Strong Extensionality*: ∀C,C ′ ∈ P( C),∀w,w′ ∈ ⌦, if we have that the two multisets
{{(C(Xn), vw(Xn)) ∶ Xn ∈ X }} = {{(C ′(Xn), v′w(Xn)) ∶ Xn ∈ X }}, then we have SG(C,w) =
SG(C ′,w′). Multiset means that the set can include multiple instances of a member, and the order
52It is also unclear whether dropping continuity can help rescue strict propriety.
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inside the set is not important. For instance, {1,1,2} and {1,2} are two di↵erent multisets, while
{1,1,2} and {1,2,1} are the same.
Shoenfield’s argument has been modified by Berger & Das into a stronger one. But the basic
ideas are similar. Let us turn to Berger & Das’ objection and then respond to their objections
together with Shoenfield’s. Here is their argument: if we drop the property of being real-valued,
then we have to drop one of the three assumptions - completeness, Strong Extensionality* or CDA*
- to invalidate their theorem that says each imprecise set of credence functions gets the same score
as a precise one at every possible world. However, they argue that we cannot drop any of the three
properties. It then follows that there can be no reason for preferring an imprecise set, which is a bad
result. Particularly, they argue that the lexicographic scoring rule violates Strong Extensionality*
and the other interval-valued scoring rules violate completeness, and these scoring rules, therefore,
are unacceptable.
Here is a relevant quotation (selected): “The defender of non-numerical measures of accuracy
could block this argument by rejecting either Completeness, or Strong Extensionality, or Probabilis-
tic Admissibility... by denying Completeness, she would have to say that the imprecise credal
state represented by C1 is incomparable with respect to global accuracy to the precise credal state
represented by C2 in every possible world. Now, plausibly, if two credal states are incomparable
to each other with respect to global accuracy in every possible world, then a rational agent cannot
regard any one of the credal states as better than, worse than, or exactly as good as the other given
solely the metric of global accuracy. Then, given solely considerations about global accuracy, an
agent also cannot have any reason to adopt the imprecise credal state over the precise
one.” (See (2), page 21) (We call Probabilistic Admissibility CDA* to make it consistent with the
terms used in the previous chapter.)
I do not agree with the above criticism. For Shoenfield’s objection, one thing worth noticing
is: even if each set of probabilistic credences centered at 0.5 will get no smaller score than a
probability function that assigns 0.5 to both propositions with respect to a legitimate scoring
rule, no matter how the world turns out to be, it does not mean that these imprecise sets get
greater scores than the precise one at every possible world. As shown by Berger & Das, we can
drop completeness to forbid this from happening. Simply consider this scenario for illustration.
Suppose that ⌦ = {H,T} and X = {H,T}. Also suppose that our global scoring rule is defined
as: SBrier′(C,w) = {SBrier(c,w) ∶ c ∈ C}, where SBrier is the famous Brier score. We have two
sets of probability functions: (i) P , such that P (H) = P (T ) = [a, b], where a < b, a = 1 − b, and (ii)
p, such that p(H) = p(T ) = 0.5. We get two scores: (i) SBrier′(P,H) = [2a2,2b2] = SBrier′(P,T ),
and (ii) SBrier′(p,H) = 0.5 = SBrier′(p, T ). Notice that P , defined as above, is centered at 0.5 for
both propositions. But, obviously, the scores of P and p are incomparable to each other, not to
say whether one is greater than the other, with respect to SBrier′ .
Taking this into consideration, Shoenfield and Berger & Das actually argue that, for scoring
rules like SBrier′ , there will be no reason for preferring any imprecise one to precise ones. That is
not true. Though the scores of p and P are incomparable to each other, we can have some reason,
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considering their scores, for preferring one to the other. To illustrate this point, let SBrier′(C,w)
be the maximum of SBrier′(C,w) and let SBrier′(C,w) be the minimum of SBrier′(C,w). Then,
if an agent prefers one that has the minimum value of [SBrier′(C,w) − SBrier′(C,w)], namely he
adopts a decision rule that selects the ones with the minimum value of the di↵erence between
SBrier′(C,w) and SBrier′(C,w), he will always adopt a precise one with respect to this scoring
rule. On the other hand, if an agent prefers one whose [SBrier′(C,w) − SBrier′(C,w)] is greater
than 0, then he will always adopt some imprecise one. This example shows that the objections from
this angle is not quite right. We can drop completeness to block both arguments, and dropping
completeness does not necessarily lead to the result that there is no reason to support an imprecise
one over other precise ones.
Besides, the objection that the lexicographic scoring rule violates Strong Extensionality* is
dubious, too. Consider the following example.
Example 45. Suppose that there is a coin in front of you. Let H denote the proposition that
‘The coin will land Head on the next toss’ and let T denote the proposition that ‘The coin
will land Tail on the next toss’. Let us abuse the notation and also denote by H the possible
world in which the proposition H is true and T is false and let H the possible world in which
the proposition H is false and T is true. Let ⌦ = {H,T} be the set of possible worlds. Bor-
rowing some idea from (71), we define a lexicographic scoring rule as a pair of a lower scoring
rule and an upper scoring rule. let < S,S > be a lexicographic scoring rule, where the lower
local scoring rule is denoted as S
L
and the upper local scoring rule is denoted as SL. And,
similarly, we use S
G
to denote the global lexicographic scoring rule and let S
G
(C,w) repre-













([c, d],1) = c2 − 2c
S
L
([c, d],0) = c2. SL =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
SL([c, d],1) = (d − 1)2
SL([c, d],0) = d2 − 1.
Berger & Das contend that this scoring rule violates Strong Extensionality*. For exam-




(C(H), vw(H)), SL(C(H) >
,< vw(H)), SL(C(T ), vw(T ), SL(C(T ), vw(T )) >>, we get SG(P,H) =<< 0.25,−0.75 >,<
−0.75,0.25 >> and S
G
(P,T ) =<< −0.75,0.25 >,< 0.25,−0.75 >> . Berger & Das’ contend that
this means Strong Extensionality* fails since << 0.25,−0.75 >,< −0.75,0.25 >>≠<< −0.75,0.25 >
,< 0.25,−0.75 >>. That is not true. They get these scores since they put the proposition H in front
of the proposition T inside <>. But let us change the order, and let T be calculated before H.
This time, we get S
G
(P,H) =<< −0.75,0.25 >,< 0.25,−0.75 >> and S
G
(P,T ) =<< 0.25,−0.75 >,<
−0.75,0.25 >> . That means, in fact, we have S
G
(P,H) = either << −0.75,0.25 >,< 0.25,−0.75 >> or
<< 0.25,−0.75 >,< −0.75,0.25 >>, and we have S
G
(P,H) = either << 0.25,−0.75 >,< −0.75,0.25 >>
or << −0.75,0.25 >,< 0.25,−0.75 >>, according to the above lexicographic scoring rule. Thus, their
scores are indeed the same, and Strong Extensionality* has been satisfied by this scoring rule. One
53This example is very similar to what has been presented in (71).
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may further argue that it should be the case that no matter what the order of the propositions is,
Strong Extensionality* should be satisfied each time we change the order. This is a very strong
assumption, and it is hard to see the plausibility of this assumption now. After all, the intuition
behind Strong Extensionality* is that the overall disutility of two multisets that are the same as a
whole should be the same.
What is more, if my true imprecise credence is the interval [a, b] instead of others, then
according to   −Maximin, which is a decision rule that respects Admissibility, and measured with
the above scoring rule, the only best choice for me is the interval [a, b], which is an imprecise
credence. So, in this situation, I have good reason for preferring an imprecise credence to any precise
credence. Further, if my true credence is [c, c], which is a precise credence, it will be concluded
that measured with this scoring rule and with respect to   −Maximin, the only best choice is [c, c].
So, according to this scoring rule, one has reason to prefer either precise or imprecise credences.
The above examples show that the objections in (68; 2) are unconvincing. Let us consider
the objection in Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler’s (45). The idea in (45) can be stated as: if we drop
the property of being real-valued , we should drop this property both for scoring rules for imprecise
credences and for scoring rules for precise credences. And if we do so, the previous works in EpDT
will be nullified. They contend that this is an unacceptable result and we should therefore reject
the proposal of dropping the property of being real-valued. I do not agree with this idea. There
is nothing irrational if I use a real-valued scoring rule in the context of precise credences, and
in the meantime use a lexicographic one in the context of imprecise credences.54 For example,
for the above lexicographic scoring rule, when we only adopt singletons, namely we only adopt
precise credences, we can use either the lower or the upper scoring rule as our scoring rule. And
because of the constraint we have set on decision rules - we only adopt decision rules that can be
reduced to  MEU - we know that either the lower or upper scoring rule is a  MEU -strictly proper for
precise credences. We therefore can save the progress we have made of EpDT on precise credences.
Besides, for the non-real-valued scoring rules SBrier′ defined above, this scoring rule will be reduced
to Brier score SBrier with respect to the domain of precise credences. So, for both scoring rules,
this problem can be easily resolved.
To summarize, we have shown that the objections in (68; 2) are not quite right, while the
objection in (45) can be easily resolved. Hence, the objections to the proposal of dropping the
property of being real-valued are not successful.
54Here is a quotation: “This leaves two options: either (i) adopt the assumptions about subjective preference
that are necessary for numerical representations of accuracy, which would entail Quantifiability for both precise and
imprecise belief states, or (ii) abandon Quantifiability altogether.” (See (45), page 11.) I agree that the subjective
preference basis for adopting precise credences may di↵er from adopting imprecise credences, for example, adopting
imprecise credences always follows from the allowance of incomplete preference while precise credence are based on
complete preference. But it seems nothing irrational if we have an incomplete preference in the domain of imprecise
credencese, meanwhile we have a complete preference in the domain of precise credences... I do not dig into this
point here, as the focus of this chapter is about characterization and a little applications issues. The rationales for
these scoring rules may be touched in some further work.
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3.5 Characterizing strictly proper scoring rules
In the above section, I have argued against the mild propriety proposal and the proposal of
dropping continuity. We now turn our eyes to the proposal of dropping the property of being
real-valued. The previous section o↵ered two examples of strictly proper, continuous and non-
real-valued scoring rules. In particular, it discusses an example of a strictly proper, continuous
and lexicographic scoring rule in detail. In this section, I will o↵er the general forms of two kinds
of strictly proper, continuous and lexicographic scoring rules. To do so, I adopt the framework
presented in (71) and take advantage of the work in (21; 59). Specifically, I o↵er the general forms
of strictly proper scoring rules with respect to two decision rules -   −Maximin and   −Maximax-
for imprecise credences. I adopt   −Maximin and   −Maximax since these two decision rules can be
reduced to  MEU when our credal set is a singleton, and they are widely discussed in the context
of imprecise credences (70; 75; 10; 1). Clearly, this is just one kind of non-real-valued scoring rule.
Other kinds of non-real-valued scoring rules, such as SBrier′ mentioned in the above section, seems
to be interesting to be investigated in further studies, too. But I will not pursue it here.
Again, let < S,S > be a lexicographic scoring rule. We call S ‘lower scoring rule’ and we call
S ‘upper scoring rule’. We use S
L
to denote the local lexicographic scoring rule. Similarly, we use
S
G
to denote the global lexicographic scoring rule that is aggregated by S
L
.
Let us start with the local lexicographic scoring rule S
L
. We assume that both S
L
and SL
are real-valued functions. That means, for each credence represented by an interval [p, q], where
p, q ∈ [0,1], both S
L
and SL assign to it a real-valued score. Formally, SL ∶ P([0,1]) × {0,1}￿→ R,
and SL ∶ P([0,1]) × {0,1}￿→ R. And, each of SL and SL identifies a score of one side of [p, q]: SL
takes p as input and SL takes q as input.
We assume that lexicographic scoring rules are continuous. We say that the local lexico-
graphic scoring rule S
L
is continuous if both S
L
and SL are continuous on [0,1].
And we have a function denoted as EU(x), which is a pair of the lower expected utility
function and the upper expected utility function < EU(x),EU(x)) >. As the name shows, EU(x) =
−xS
L
(x,1) − (1 − x)S
L
(x,0), and EU(x) = −xSL(x,1) − (1 − x)SL(x,0). Notice that both EU(x)
and EU(x) are the negatives of its expected score functions. Let EU ′(x) be the gradient of EU(x)
at point x, we have the following equations:
(i) S
L
(x,1) = −EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x), and, S
L
(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x).
(ii) SL(x,0) = −EU(x) − (1 − x)EU ′(x), and, SL(x,0) = −EU(x) + xEU ′(x).
Now, let us present the general forms.
3.5.1   −Maximin-strictly proper and   −Maximax-strictly proper scoring rules
Based on the work in (21; 59), we have the following theorem to characterize   −Maximin-
strictly proper scoring rules:
Theorem 46. A continuous and lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is   −Maximin-strictly proper
i↵ there exist the corresponding expected utility functions - EU(x) and EU(x) - that are strictly
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convex, and (i) EU(x) is strictly increasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly decreasing, on [0,1].
Example 47. Let EU(x) = x2 and let EU(x) = (x−1)2. We know that EU(x) is strictly increasing,







([c, d],1) = c2 − 2c
S
L
([c, d],0) = c2. SL =
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
SL([c, d],1) = (d − 1)2
SL([c, d],0) = d2 − 1.
This is the scoring rule that have been presented in Example 45, and it can be concluded that
S
L
defined as above is a   −Maximin-strictly proper scoring rule: whenever we input the credence
[a, b], with respect to   −Maximin and measured with this scoring rule, the output will be {[a, b]}.
For   −Maximax-strictly proper scoring rules, we have:
Theorem 48. A continuous and lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is   −Maximax-strictly proper
i↵ there exist the corresponding expected utility functions - EU(x) and EU(x) - that are strictly
convex, and (i) EU(x) is strictly decreasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly increasing, on [0,1].
The reason for o↵ering the above general forms is simple. We do it to satisfy those who want
their credences to be measured in some specific way. And based on the general forms, one can easily
get some scoring rules that satisfy his needs of measuring. For instance, what we have presented in
Example 45 and Example 47 are both Brier-styled. But in some situation, an agent might want to
have a Log-styled score or a Spherical-styled score as what we have for precise credences (22; 39).
For example, (17) advocates the Log-styled one and (18) objects the Brier-styled one for precise
credences, while (30; 56) both advocate the Brier-styled one. There will, no doubt, be similar
concerns for imprecise credences. Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 2, there are a lot of works
on EU(x) and Bregman divergence in di↵erent disciplines, the above theorems can bridge these
researches.
3.5.2 Strictly proper global scoring rules
You may notice that I ignore the discussion on global scoring rule S
G
in the above sections. Let
us do it in this section. In fact, I have bad news here: if we accept the Extensionality** assumption
defined below, then there exists no strictly proper global scoring rule for imprecise credences.
Extensionality**: ∀C,C ′ ∈ P( C),∀w ∈ ⌦, if ∀X ∈ X ∶ C(X) = C ′(X), then we have
SG(C,w) = SG(C ′,w).
Theorem 49. If SG is a scoring rule for imprecise credences that satisfies Extensionality**, then
it is not strictly proper.
Why? A simple example for illustration:
Example 50. Suppose that there is a coin in front of you. Let H denote the proposition that ‘The
coin will land Head on the next toss’ and let T denote the proposition that ‘The coin will land Tail
on the next toss’. Let us abuse the notation and also denote by H the possible world in which the
proposition H is true and T is false and let T be the possible world in which the proposition H is
false and T is true. Let ⌦ = {H,T} be the set of possible worlds. Consider two cases:
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(i) You adopt an imprecise credences C ′ such that C ′ = {p￿p(H) + p(T ) = 1,0.3 ≤ p(H) ≤ 0.7};
(ii) You adopt an imprecise credences C ′ such that C ′′ = {c￿c(H) = c(T ),0.3 ≤ c(H) ≤ 0.7}.
We know C ′(H) = C ′′(H) = [0.3,0.7]&C ′(T ) = C ′′(T ) = [0.3,0.7]. Then, according to
Extensionality**, for every legitimate scoring rule SG and at every possible world, we have
SG(C ′,w) = SG(C ′′,w). We thus know that for any decision rule   that respects Admissibility,
we have C ′ ∈  (SG, C ′) → C ′′ ∈  (SG, C ′). Since, obviously, C ′ ≠ C ′′, we know that SG cannot be
 −strictly proper. And because   is an arbitrary decision rule that respects Admissibility, it follows
that SG is not strictly proper, either.
It is hard to reject Extensionality**, so the above theorem shows that we must change the
definition of strict propriety of the global scoring rule o↵ered above to continue our discussion. My
idea is: we can abandon the idea that the epistemic state should be considered as a unified one.
Instead, we consider it as a set of credences assignments.55 Then, for defining strict propriety,
we only require that the unique best output is exactly the set of credences assignments, however,
ignore the mathematical structure - the set of credence functions - that achieve these credences
assignments. This idea, of course, cannot satisfy those who want to defend epistemic norms solely
by the joint work of the global score and a decision rule that respects Admissibility, since the
global scores of two di↵erent sets of credence functions - no matter whether or not probabilistic
as shown in the above example - may possibly be the same at every possible world. But this
definition is consistent with the basic idea of epistemic disutility: to measure epistemic disutility,
what matters is the distance between a set of credences and the truth. What is more, it is far from
hopeless to defend some epistemic norm for imprecise credences if we define strict propriety in this
way. One may put forward some further constraint on epistemic rationality when they dig into the
mathematical structures. For example, one may argue that one cannot choose any non-probabilistic
credence function to construct the mathematical structures since we cannot choose any credence
function that is dominated by another. We will say more about this point in Appendix II.
Let us move on to discuss strict propriety of global scoring rules. We use S
G
to denote the
global lexicographic scoring rule that is aggregated by S
L
. And, we o↵er a new definition of strict
propriety* as follows:
Definition 51. A lexicographic global scoring rule for imprecise credences S
G
is  −strictly
proper* if ∀C ∈   < S
G
, P >, we have ∀X ∈ X ∶ C(X) = P (X). We say S is strictly proper* if
it is  −strictly proper*, for some   ∈DA.
Now, you may be curious about the relationship between the global scoring rule and the local
scoring rule that underlies it. One may think that a natural assumption between the local one
and the global one would be a kind of Additivity. For example, one may assume Additivity*,
too, which says: S
G
(C,w) = ∑X∈X SL(C(X), vw(X)) and SG(C,w) = ∑X∈X SL(C(X), vw(X)).
However, unfortunately, this has problematic consequences. Recall Example 45, suppose P =
{p￿p(H) = p(T ) = 0.5}, we will get S
G
(P,H) =< 0.25 − 0.75,−0.75 + 0.25 >=< −0.5,−0.5 > and




(P,T ) =< −0.75 + 0.25,0.25 − 0.75 >=< −0.5,−0.5 > . And suppose P ′ = {p￿p(H) ∈ [0.3,0.7], we
have S
G
(P ′,H) =< 0.09−0.51,−0.51+0.09 >=< −0.42,−0.42 > and S
G
(P ′, T ) =< −0.51+0.09,0.09−







(P,T ) < S
G
(P ′, T ). In other words, P dominates P ′ measured with this scoring rule. This is
an unacceptable result.
Let us turn to another proposal, which has been put forward by Seidenfeld et al.. As stated





(X1, vw(X1)), SL(X1, vw(X1)), ..., SL(Xn, vw(Xn)), SL(Xn, vw(Xn)) >.
Based on this assumption, we can get the two theorems below concerning strict propriety of
the global scoring rules for imprecise credences:
Theorem 52. The global scoring rule S
G




Theorem 53. The global scoring rule S
G




Of course, the issue of the relationship between the global scoring rule and its underlying local
scoring rule is far from settled. But the above results show that it is not hopeless to step forward.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, I present the definitions of strict propriety and of continuity in the context
of imprecise credences. Based on these, I illustrate the meaning of the Impossibility Result in the
literature. After that, I investigate three possible ways in response to the Impossibility Result and
show the problems with the proposals of mild propriety and dropping continuity. I argue that
the so-called mild propriety proposal is unsatisfactory, while the proposal of dropping continuity
leads to strange scoring rules if we want to save the existing progress. Then, I respond to several
objections to the proposal of dropping the property of being real-valued. Finally, I o↵er the general
forms of two kinds of strictly proper, continuous and lexicographic scoring rules for imprecise
credences.
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3.7 Appendix I Related literature
3.7.1 Decision rules
In the main body, I present the definitions of   −Maximax and of   −Maximin. Here, I present
the definitions of the other decision rules. Then, I will present the Theorem 1 in (75), which will
be useful during the proof of Theorem 36.
We have Ex[SL(C ′(X))] ∶= [−xSL(C ′(X),1) − (1 − x)SL(C ′(X),0)].
And, Ec[SG(C ′)] ∶= [−∑w∈⌦ c(w)SG(C ′,w)].
Here are the definitions:
(i)  E−Admissible: A decision rule   is  E−Admissible if
a. E−Admissible(SL, C(X)) = {C ′(X)￿∃x ∈ C(X),∀C ′′(X) ∶ Ex[SL(C ′(X))] ≥ Ex[SL(C ′′(X))];
b. E−Admissible(SG, C) = {C ′￿∃c ∈ C,∀C ′′ ∶ Ec[SG(C ′)] ≥ Ec[SG(C ′′)].
 E−Admissible picks a set of options, such that for each option inside the set, there exists a
probability function in the input set, from the perspective of which the expected utility of this
option is greatest among all. This decision rule has been adopted in (71) when they characterize
strictly proper scoring rules.  E−Admissible picks more than one option frequently. Thus, it is not a
good decision rule when we discuss strict propriety - strict propriety requires that the output set
is a singleton. ( (71) uses this decision rule together with   −Maximin or   −Maxinax ) Therefore,
I ignore this decision rule in the main body. Most of the subsequent decision rules have the same
feature, so I ignore them, too.
(ii)  Maximality: A decision rule   is  Maximality if
a. Maximality(SL, C(X)) = {C ′(X)￿∀C ′′(X),∃x ∈ C(X) ∶ Ex[SL(C ′(X))] ≥ Ex[SL(C ′′(X))];
b. Maximality(SG, C) = {C ′￿∀C ′′,∃c ∈ C ∶ Ec[SG(C ′)] ≥ Ec[SG(C ′′)];
 Maximality picks a set of options, such that for each option in the set, compared to any
alternative option, there exists a probability function in the input set, from the perspective of
which the expected utility of this option is no less than the alternative option.
(iii)  Hurwicz: A decision rule   is  Hurwicz if
 Hurwicz(SL,C(X)) = {C ′(X)￿∀C ′′(X) ∶
[−↵SL(C ′(X),1) − (1 − ↵)SL(C ′(X),0)] ≥ [−↵SL(C ′′(X),1) − (1 − ↵)SL(C ′′(X),0)]}.
 Hurwicz picks a set of options that have the greatest value of the weighted sum. According to this
decision rule, once the scoring rule and the value of ↵ has been settled, the set of options will be settled.
The input set C(X) is of no use. This decision rule is, therefore, not suitable for characterizing strictly
proper scoring rules: strict propriety leads to the result that your output is always the same as your input.
(iv)  intervaldominance: A decision rule   is  intervaldominance if
a. intervaldominance(SL,C(X)) = {C ′(X)￿∀C ′′(X) ∶ EC(X)[SL(C ′(X))] ≥ EC(X)[SL(C ′′(X))]},
b. intervaldominance(SG,C) = {C ′￿∀C ′′ ∶ EC[SG(C ′)] ≥ EC[SG(C ′′)].
 intervaldominance picks the most member to constitute its output set among all the abovementioned
decision rules. This decision rule picks an option if and only if its greatest expected utility with respect to
the input set is no less than the minimum expected utility of any other options.
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3.7.2 Tro↵aes’ Theorem 1
Here is the Theorem 1 in (75), which presents the implication among di↵erent decision rules:
Theorem 1:
(i) First, we have:
C
′(X) ∈   −Maximax(SL,C(X))→ C ′(X) ∈  E−admissible(SL,C(X))
C
′(X) ∈  E−admissible(SL,C(X))→ C ′(X) ∈  Maximal(SL,C(X))
C
′(X) ∈  Maximal(SL,C(X))→ C ′(X) ∈  intervaldominance(SL,C(X)),
C
′(X) ∈   −Maximin(SL,C(X))→ C ′(X) ∈  Maximal(SL,C(X))
C
′(X) ∈  Maximal(SL,C(X))→ C ′(X) ∈  intervaldominance(SL,C(X));
(ii) Second, we have:
C
′ ∈   −Maximax(SG,C)→ C ′ ∈  E−admissible(SG,C);
C
′ ∈  E−admissible(SG,C)→ C ′ ∈  Maximal(SG,C)&C ′ ∈  intervaldominance(SG,C),
C
′ ∈   −Maximin(SG,C)→ C ′ ∈  Maximal(SG,C)&C ′ ∈  intervaldominance(SG,C).
The above theorem says: with respect to a certain input and a scoring rule, whenever an option has
been picked by   −Maximax, then it must be picked by  E−admissible; whenever an option has been picked
by  E−admissible or by   −Maximin, then it must be picked by  Maximal; and whenever an option has been
picked by  Maximal, it must be picked by  Hurwicz.
3.8 Appendix II Existing scoring rules and Probabilism
In this section, I examine three existing scoring rules and their interaction with Probabilism in the
context of imprecise credences. For the sake of simplicity, we only discuss the case in which there are only
two propositions in X .
Suppose that there is a coin in front of you. Let H denote the proposition that ‘The coin will land
Head on the next toss’ and let T denote the proposition that ‘The coin will land Tail on the next toss’.
Let us abuse the notation and also denote by H the possible world in which the proposition H is true and
T is false and let H the possible world in which the proposition H is false and T is true. Let ⌦ = {H,T}
be the set of possible worlds. And, we have X = {H,T}, too. It is not hard to see that the set  P of all
the probability functions is:  P = {p￿p(H) + p(T ) = 1}.
To investigate Probabilism using the existing scoring rules, it is impossible to cover it in this small
section. What I will do is, first, to examine (i) whether or not all subsets of  P are rationally permitted
or rationally required, and then to examine (ii) whether or not some set that are non-probabilistic is
rationally permitted, with respect to these scoring rules. To decide whether one is rationally permitted or
rationally required, following (68; 2), I will put two constraints on decision rules. These constraints have
been mentioned in the main body, they are: Nondominance and respecting Admissibility. Here we state
the definitions again:
Nondominance: We say a decision rule   satisfies Nondominance, If ∀C ′′ ∈ P( C), such that if
∃C ∈ P( C)),∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C,w) < SG(C ′,w), then we have C ′ ∉  (SG,C ′′).
Respecting Admissibility: We say a decision rule   respects Admissibility, if ∀C ′′ ∈ P( C),
such that if a.∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C,w) ≤ SG(C ′,w); and b.C ′ ∈  (SG,C ′′), then we have C ∈  (SG,C ′′).
Let   be an arbitrary decision rule that satisfies the above two constraints, I o↵er the two definitions
below:
(i) We say C is rationally required with respect to SG if ∃C ′ ∈ P( C) ∶ {C} =  (SG,C ′).
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(ii) We say C is rationally permitted with respect to SG if ∃C ′ ∈ P( C),C ∈  (SG,C ′).
It is easy to see that based on the above definitions, if an option is rationally required, then it must be
rationally permitted. Besides, all of the six decision rules, as argued in the main body, respect Admissibility,
and all of them, expect  intervaldominance, satisfies Nondominance constraint, too. The latter result has
been proved in (10).
Intuitively, if some sets of probabilistic credence functions are neither rationally required nor rationally
permitted, then Probabilism cannot be easily defended. And if all sets of probability functions are rationally
required or rationally permitted, and some set of non-probabilistic credence functions is rationally required
or rationally permitted, then we need some additional rationality requirement to defend Probabilism: we
cannot simply use the overall scores and a decision rules that obey both constraints to defend Probabilism.
3.8.1 Konek’s improper scoring rule
Let S be an arbitrary strictly proper, continuous and real-valued global scoring rule for precise cre-
dences. Let S(C,w) be the smallest score assigned to c ∈ C by S, and let S(C,w) be the greatest score
assigned to c′ ∈ C by S. Let ↵ be a number in [0,1] that represents your personal weight (on avoiding
error). Here is Konek’s scoring rule:
SG(C,w) = ↵S(C,w) + (1 − ↵)S(C,w),↵ ∈ [0,1]. (1)
Though it seems plausible, (1) has some bad feature when we want to defend Probabilism in the
context of imprecise credences. As Konek notices himself in (33), this scoring rule makes some imprecise
credences dominated. Berger & Das in their Appendix point out that this scoring rule makes some sets
of probabilistic credence functions dominated. And since they are dominated, these sets of probabilistic
credence functions are not even rationally permitted with respect to (1). This is a very bad news.
3.8.2 Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler’s mildly proper scoring rule
Let S be an arbitrary strictly proper, continuous and real-valued global scoring rule for precise cre-
dences. And let f be a selection function that selects the credence function whose score at every possible
world equals to the score of a set of credence functions. Formally, we have f ∶ P( C) →  C, and
∀X ∈X ∶ f(C)(X) ∈ C(X). Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler’s scoring rule is:
SG(C,w) = S(f(C),w),∀X ∈X ∶ f(C)(X) ∈ C(X). (2)
It is hard to see whether this scoring rule makes all sets of probability functions rationally permitted
before f has been clearly defined (obviously no set of probability function is rationally required).56 Here
is an example for illustration:
Consider two cases: (i) You adopt a set of imprecise credences C ′ such that C ′ = {p￿p(H) + p(T ) =
1,0.3 ≤ p(H) ≤ 0.7}; (ii) You adopt a set of imprecise credences C ′′ such that C ′′ = {c￿c(H) = c(T ),0.3 ≤
c(H) ≤ 0.7}. And if your selection function makes such a choice: f(C ′) = {c￿c(H) = 0.49, c(T ) = 0.5} and
f(C ′′) = {c￿c(H) = 0.5, c(T ) = 0.5}. Then obviously C ′ will not be rationally permitted because strict
propriety leads to the result that C ′ will be dominated by a probability function. That means, measured
with this scoring rule some sets of probabilistic credence functions may not even be rationally permitted.
56Thanks to Jiji Zhang for pointing out this to me.
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This is bad. You probably think that this section function is too arbitrary and is implausible. Let us
employ a more plausible selection function. Consider your new selection function f ′ that makes such a
choice: f ′(C ′) = {c￿c(H) = 0.5, c(T ) = 0.5} and f ′(C ′′) = {c￿c(H) = 0.5, c(T ) = 0.5}. That is, this selection
function selects exactly the mid point of each C(X). But this selection function makes the scores of C ′
be equal to the scores of C ′′ whatever possible world it turns out to be, so some sets of non-probabilistic
credence functions will be rationally permitted. This seems not good, either. But good news is that all sets
of probability functions will be rationally permitted now, since the midpoints of credences intervals assigned
by a convex set of probability functions will consist a probability function. And, based on  MEU -strict
propriety of S, there will always be a non-probabilistic credence function makes this probability function
rationally permitted with respect to this scoring rule. For non-probabilistic sets, it can be easily derived
that each non-probabilistic precise set will not be rationally permitted because of the  MEU -strict propriety
of S. And the above example shows that some non-probabilistic imprecise sets, e.g. C ′′, are rationally
permitted. So, to defend Probabilism, some further e↵ort needs to be made.
3.8.3 Lexicographic strictly proper scoring rule
Now, let us turn to the lexicographic scoring rules. It has some bad features when we consider
Probabilism in the context of imprecise credences, too. Consider two cases: (i) You adopt an imprecise
credences C ′ such that C ′ = {p￿p(H) + p(T ) = 1,0.3 ≤ p(H) ≤ 0.7}; (ii) You adopt a set of imprecise





(C ′′,w),∀w ∈ ⌦. Then, some set of non-probabilistic credence functions will be rationally permitted
according to this scoring rule. This is bad. The good news is that all probability functions will be rationally
permitted with respect to this scoring rule, too. This follows trivially from  Maximin−strict propriety* or
 Maximax−strict propriety* of SG. Henceforth, similar to the above scoring rule, to defend Probabilism,
some further e↵ort needs to be made if we use this scoring rule.
3.9 Appendix III Proof of the theorems
Theorem 32. (Impossibility Result) [Seidenfeld et al. and Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler]. If SL is a
scoring rule for imprecise credences that is both continuous and real-valued, then it impossible for SL to be
strictly proper.
Proof : Seidenfeld et al. and Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler both provide their proofs. Here, we o↵er a
sketch of the proof in (45). Let SL be a local scoring rule for imprecise credences. If SL is strictly proper,
continuous and real-valued, then we must have one-one, continuous and real-valued maps SL(⋅ ,1) and
SL(⋅ ,0). However, it is impossible to have a continuous and one-one map from P([0,1]) to R. So, it
cannot be true that SL is strictly proper, continuous and real-valued. In other words, it is impossible to
have a strictly proper, continuous and real-valued local scoring rule for imprecise credences. ￿
Theorem 35. If S is a continuous and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise credences, then all of
  −Maximin,   −Maximin,  E−admissible,  Maximal,  Hurwicz and  Intervaldominance respect Admissibility.
Proof : To prove this, we can first prove that all of   −Maximin,   −Maximax and  Hurwicz respect
Admissibility, and then we apply Theorem 1 in (75), which is stated in the above section, to finish the
proof.
It is easy to get the conclusion that all of   −Maximin,   −Maximax and  Hurwicz respect Admissibility.
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Let us consider the case for   −Maximin, and, ignore the prove of the cases for   −Maximax and for  Hurwicz,
since they are very similar.
Let SL(C ′(X),0) ≤ SL(C(X),0) and SL(C ′(X),1) ≤ SL(C(X),1). And let C(X) ∈
  −Maximin(SL,C ′′′(X)). According to the definition of   −Maximin, we know: EC′′′(X)[SL(C(X))] ≥
E
C′′′(X)[SL(C ′′(X))], for all C ′′(X) ∈ P([0,1]). Then, we have: EC′′′(X)[SL(C ′(X))] ≥
E
C′′′(X)[SL(C ′′(X))], for all C ′′(X) ∈ P([0,1]). So, we get C ′(X) ∈   −Maximin(SL,C ′′′(X)) as required.
And for the global case, the reasoning is similar. Let SG(C ′,w) ≤ SG(C,w),∀w ∈ ⌦. Let C ∈
  −Maximin(SG,C ′′′). According to the definition of   −Maximin, we know: EC′′′[SG(C)] ≥ EC′′′[SG(C ′′)]
for all C ′′ ∈ P( C). Then, we have: E
C′′′[SG(C ′)] ≥ EC′′′[SG(C ′′)] for all C ′′ ∈ P( C) for all C ′′ ∈ P( C).
So, we get C ′ ∈   −Maximin(SG,C ′′′) as required.
Then based on Theorem 1, we can complete the proof. ￿
Theorem 36. It is impossible to have a real-valued, continuous and [  −Maximin or   −Maximax or
 E−admissible or  Maximal or  Hurwicz or  Intervaldominance]-strictly proper local scoring rule SL for im-
precise credences.
Proof : This theorem can be derived easily from Theorem 32 and Theorem 35. ￿
Theorem 39. [Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler] If SL satisfies the seven assumptions, namely being real-
valued, continuity, Mild Immodesty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, SOL, Monotonicity, Extensionality*, then
∀C(X) ∈ P([0,1]),∃x ∈ C(X),∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SL(x, vw(X)) = SL(C(X), vw(X)).
Proof : See (45) for a proof. ￿
Theorem 40. If SL satisfies the seven assumptions, namely being real-valued, continuity, Mild Immod-
esty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, SOL, Monotonicity, Extensionality*, and SG and SL satisfy Local-Global
Connection, then ∀C ∈ P( C),∃c ∈ C ∶ [∀X ∈X ∶ c(X) ∈ C(X)]&[∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C,w) = SG(c,w)].
Proof : Let X = {X1,X2, ...,Xn}. According to Theorem 39, we know that ∀C(X) ∈ P([0,1]),∃x ∈
C(X),∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SL(x, vw(X)) = SL(C(X), vw(X)). Let c be the credence function such that ∀X ∈ X ∶
(c(X) = x)&(SL(c(X), vw(X)) = SL(C(X), vw(X))). That means, c is the credence function that assigns
to each proposition Xn the credence that gets exactly the same score as C. We know for sure that c exists.
Then by Local-Global Connection, we have ∀C ∈ P( C),∃c ∈  C ∶ [∀X ∈ X ∶ c(X) ∈ C(X)]&[∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶
SG(C,w) = SG(c,w)], as required. ￿
Theorem 41. If SL satisfies the seven assumptions, namely being real-valued, continuity, Mild Immod-
esty*, Strict Truth-Directedness*, SOL, Monotonicity, Extensionality*, and SG and SL satisfy Local-Global
Connection, then ∀C ∈ P( C), ￿C ￿ > 1,∃C ′ ∈ P( C), ￿C ′￿ > 1 ∶ [∀X ∈ X ∶ C ′(X) ⊂ C(X)]&[∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶
SG(C ′,w) = SG(C,w)]. Furthermore, there exists infinitely many such C ′ that gets the same score as C at
every possible world.
Proof : We identify each set of credences C(X) = [a, b] to the point (a, b). So the set of all sets of
imprecise credenes is: {(x, y) ∶ 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1}. And to prove the theorem, we first show such a set of
imprecise credences exists, and we then show that we have infinitely many similar ways to find such a set.
Let C(X) ⊂ [0,1] be an arbitrary set of imprecise credences and C(X) = [a, b]. Let c(X) = e that satisfies
Theorem 40. Namely, SL([a, b],0) = SL(e,0) and SL([a, b],1) = SL(e,1).
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We now consider three cases: (i) a = e, (ii) b = e and (iii) a < e < b. And we are going to show that a
set that gets the same score as [a, b] whatever the truth value is exists.
Let SL be an arbitrary local scoring rule that satisfies the constraints.
First, let us consider the case (i). Let g ∈ [a, b], g > a, g ≠ b. In other words, [a, g] ⊂ [a, b]. Now we
show that SL([a, b],0) = SL([a, g],0) and SL([a, b],1) = SL([a, g],1). Here is the reason. By SOL, we
have SL(e,0) ≤ SL([a, g],0) ≤ SL([a, b],0). Since SL(e,0) = SL([a, b],0), we get SL(e,0) = SL([a, g],0) =
SL([a, b],0). By Monotonicity, we get SL(e,1) ≥ SL([a, g],1) ≥ SL([a, b],1). Since SL(e,1) = SL([a, b],1),
we get SL(e,1) = SL([a, g],1) = SL([a, b],1), too. Combining, we get what we want: SL([a, b],0) =
SL([a, g],0) and SL([a, b],1) = SL([a, g],1), where [a, g] ⊂ [a, b]. Since g is arbitrary, we can find infinitely
many such subset that gets the same score as [a, b] no matter what the truth value is. The case of (ii) is
simply symmetric with the case (i), and we ignore the proof of this case.
We now consider the case (iii). Since a < e < b, we can always find g < b such that [f, g] ⊂ [a, b],
where e < f . Now we show that ∃c ∈ [a, f] such that SL([a, b],0) = SL([c, g],0) and SL([a, b],1) =
SL([c, g],1). By Strict Truth-Directedness*, we have SL(e,0) = SL([a, b],0) < SL([f, g],0) and SL(e,1) =
SL([a, b],1) > SL([f, g],1). By SOL, we get SL(e,0) = SL([a, b],0) ≥ SL([a, g],0). By Monotonicity, we get
SL(e,1) = SL([a, b],1) ≤ SL([a, g],1). To combine, we get SL([a, g],0) ≤ SL([a, b],0) < SL([f, g],0); and
SL([a, g],1) ≥ SL([a, b],1) > SL([f, g],1). It is easy to see that the set {(x, g) ∶ a ≤ x ≤ f, g ∈ [0,1]}
is connected. Then by continuity and Mean Value Theorem, we know that ∃c ∈ [a, f] such that
SL([a, g],0) ≤ SL([c, g],0) < SL([f, g],0) and SL([a, b],0) = SL([c, g],0). And ∃d ∈ [a, f] such that
SL([a, g],1) ≥ SL([d, g],1) > SL([f, g],1) and SL([a, b],1) = SL([d, g],1). We claim SL([c, g],1) =
SL([d, g],1). Here is the reason. According to Theorem 39, we know that ∃f ∈ [c, g] such that
SL(f,0) = SL([c, g],0) and SL(f,1) = SL([c, g],1). Because SL([c, g],0) = SL([a, b],0) = SL(e,0),
we have SL(f,0) = SL(e,0). Then according to Theorem 9, we have f = e. It follows that we have
SL(f,1) = SL(e,1) = SL([c, g],1) = SL([d, g],1). So we’ve have found a subset [c, g] ⊂ [a, b], such that
SL([a, b],0) = SL([c, g],0) and SL([a, b],1) = SL([c, g],1). Since g is arbitrary, we can find infinitely many
such set.
Combining case (i), (ii) and (iii), we get the result that we can always find infinitely many subsets of
[a, b] that gets the same score whatever the truth value is with respect to a legitimate local scoring rule.
Now, let C ′ be the set of credence function such that ∀X ∈X ∶ (C ′(X) = [x, y])&(SL(C ′(X), vw(X)) =
SL(C(X), vw(X))). That means, C ′ is the set of credence functions that assigns to each proposition Xn a
set of credences that gets the same score as C(Xn) whatever the truth value is. We know for sure that C ′
exists and there exists infinitely many from the proof above. Then according to Local-Global Connection,
we have (i) ∀C ∈ P( C), ￿C ￿ > 1,∃C ′ ∈ P( C), ￿C ′￿ > 1 ∶ [∀X ∈ X ∶ C ′(X) ⊂ C(X)]&[∀w ∈ ⌦ ∶ SG(C ′,w) =
SG(C,w)], and (ii) we can find infinitely many C ′, as required.
We therefore complete our proof. ￿
Theorem 43. [Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler] A strictly proper and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise
credence is discontinuous almost everywhere.
Proof : See (45) for a proof. ￿
Theorem 44. (i) It is impossible to have a  -strictly proper and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise
credences that satisfies Additivity, Joycean Constraint and Strict Truth-Directedness*, where   ∈ DA can be
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reduced to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)} or C = {c} is a singleton. (ii) It is impossible to have a  -strictly
proper and real-valued scoring rule for imprecise credences that satisfies Additivity, Joycean Constraint,
SOL and Monotonicity, where   ∈ DA can be reduced to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)} or C = {c} is a
singleton.
Proof : We prove both by reductio.
Fist, we prove (i). Suppose we can find a local scoring rule that satisfies all the constraints, and let
a scoring rule that satisfies all the constraint be SL. Suppose that SL is  -strictly proper, where
  ∈ DA can be reduced to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)} is a singleton. So, SL is  MEU -strictly proper with
respect to the domain of precise credences, namely [0,1]. And since SL satisfies Additivity and Joycean
Constraint, and from Example 23 and (67) we know that SL must be continuous restricted to the interval
[0,1] (discussed in Section 2.7.1). Namely, SL is a strictly proper, continuous, and real-valued scoring rule
restricted to the domain of precise credences.
Now let us choose two points a, b ∈ [0,1], where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1. Because SL is  MEU -strictly proper with
respect to the domain of precise credences, then according to Theorem 9, we know that SL(a,0) < SL(b,0)
and SL(a,1) > SL(b,1). Let’s consider an imprecise credences [c,d], such that 0 ≤ a < c < d < b ≤ 1. Then,
if SL satisfies Strict Truth-directedness*, it must be the case that SL(a,0) < SL([c, d],0) < SL(b,0) and
SL(a,1) > SL([c, d],1) > SL(b,1).
However, this conflicts with the assumption that SL is  -strictly proper. Here is the reason. Let
SL(a,0) = x,SL([c, d],0) = y,SL(b,0) = z, we have x < y < z. Since SL is continuous in the interval
[0,1], then by Mean Value Theorem we can always find f ∈ [a, b], such that SL(f,0) = y. That means,
SL(f,0) = SL([c, d],0) = y. Besides, either (a) SL(f,1) ≤ SL([c, d],1), or, (b) SL(f,1) ≥ SL([c, d],1). If
(a) is the case then we know that SL is not  -strictly proper, since no matter what our input credence
is, whenever [c, d] is a choice, then we must include f as a choice (  ∈ DA); if (b) is the case then we
know SL is not  -strictly proper, either, since whenever f is a choice, then we must include [c, d] as a
choice (  ∈ DA). To combine (a) and (b), since [c, d] ≠ f , we know that SL is not  -strictly proper. So
we’ve got a contradiction and we know that our assumption is false. Then we know that it is impossible
to have a  -strictly proper and real-valued local scoring rule SL for imprecise credences that satisfies
Additivity, Joycean Constraint and Strict Truth-directedness*, where   ∈ DA can be reduced to  MEU
when C(X) = {c(X)} or C = {c} is a singleton.
Now, we prove (ii). Again, let a scoring rule that satisfies all the constraint be SL. Suppose that
SL is  -strictly proper, where   ∈ DA can be reduced to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)} is a singleton.
So, SL is  MEU -strictly proper with respect to the domain of precise credences, namely [0,1]. And since
SL satisfies Additicvity and Joycean constraint, and from Example 23 and (67) we know that SL must be
continuous in the interval [0,1].
Again, we can choose two points a, b ∈ [0,1], where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1. Because SL is  MEU -strictly
proper in the interval [0,1], then according to Theorem 9, we know that SL(a,0) < SL(b,0) and SL(a,1) >
SL(b,1). Now, let us consider an imprecise credences [a, b]. According to SOL, SL(a,0) ≤ SL([a, b],0)
and according to Monotonicity SL(a,1) ≥ SL([a, b],1). Similarly, we have SL(b,0) ≥ SL([a, b],0) and
SL(b,1) ≤ SL([a, b],1). Let SL(a,0) = x,SL([a, b],0) = y,SL(b,0) = z, we know that x ≤ y ≤ z, a ≠ y.
Similar to the above proof, by Mean Value Theorem, we can find a f ∈ [a, b], such that SL(f,0) = y. So,
SL(f,0) = SL([a, b],0) = y. Besides, either (a) SL(f,1) ≤ SL([a, b],1) or (b) SL(f,1) ≥ SL([a, b],1). If
(a) is the case then we know that SL is not  -strictly proper, since no matter what our input credence is,
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whenever [a, b] is a choice, then we must include f as a choice (  ∈ DA); if (b) is the case then we know SL is
not  -strictly proper, either, since whenever f is a choice, then we must include [a, b] as a choice (  ∈ DA),
too. To combine (a) and (b), since [a, b] ≠ f , we know that SL is not  -strictly proper. So we’ve got
a contradiction and we know that our assumption is false. Then we know that it is impossible to have
a  -strictly proper and real-valued local scoring rule SL for imprecise credences that satisfies Additivity,
Joycean Constraint, SOL and Monotonicity, where   ∈ DA can be reduced to  MEU when C(X) = {c(X)}
or C = {c} is a singleton.
To combine, we complete the proof. ￿
Theorem 46. A continuous and lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is   −Maximin-strictly proper i↵ there
exist the corresponding expected utility functions - EU(x) and EU(x) - that are strictly convex, and (i)
EU(x) is strictly increasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly decreasing, on [0,1].
Proof : To prove this theorem, we first prove the ‘if’ part, then we prove the ‘only if’ part.
Let   −Maximin(SL, P (X)) = {C(X)￿C(X) ∈ P([0,1])}.
First, we prove the ‘if’ part. We prove that if there exist the corresponding expected utility functions -
EU(x) and EU(x) - are strictly convex, and (i)EU(x) is strictly increasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly decreasing,
in [0,1], then the lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is   −Maximin-strictly proper.
We know either P (X) is a singleton or not. First, let us suppose that P (X) is a singleton, then
we know that   −Maximin has been reduced to  MEU . Since both EU(x) and EU(x) are strictly convex,
according to Gneiting & Raftery Theorem, the lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is  MEU -strictly proper.
And it follows that the lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is   −Maximin-strictly proper.
Next we prove the case in which P (X) is not a singleton. We need to show that {P (X)} =
  −Maximin(SL, P (X)). For the lower scoring rule EU(x), we know that the expected utility of C(X)
from P (X)’s perspective, where C(X) ∈ P([0,1]), will be strictly increasing as the value x ∈ P (X)
increases. That is because EU(x) is strictly increasing, it follows that EU ′(x) > 0, then we have
∀C ′(X) ∈ P([0,1]) ∶ −S
L
(C ′(X),0) < −S
L
(C ′(X),1). So, the minimum expected utility of C(X) from
P (X)’s perspective will be achieved at the minimum value in P (X) measured with the lower scoring rule.
Let us use P (X) to denote the minimum x in P (X), that is x = P (X). Then, the minimum expected
utility of C(X) from P (X)’s perspective equals to xS
L
(C(X),1) + (1 − x)S
L
(C(X),0)), x = P (X). Be-





the maximum when C(X) = x. That means, we get the result that the maximum minimum expected
utility of C(X) from P (X)’s perspective, measured with the lower scoring rule, will always be achieved
when P (X) = C(X). The case for the upper scoring rule is symmetric to the case for the lower scoring
rule. We get the result that the maximum minimum expected utility of C(X) from P (X)’s perspective,
measured with the upper scoring rule, will be achieved when P (X) = C(X). To combine, we get that
the maximum minimum expected utility will always be the set P (X) = C(X) = P (X) = C(X). That
means, C(X) = P (X). So, we have {P (X)} =   −Maximin(SL, P (X)) as required, which means that SL is
  −Maximin-strictly proper.
To combine, we complete the ‘if’ part.
Then we prove the ‘only if’ part. We prove that if S
L
is   −Maximin-strictly proper, then there exists
a corresponding EU(x) such that both EU(x) and EU(x) are strictly convex, and (i)EU(x) is strictly
increasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly decreasing, in [0,1].
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It is easy to see that there exist EU(x) and EU(x). We show that they are strictly convex, and
(i)EU(x) is strictly increasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly decreasing, in [0,1]. Since when we only adopt P (X)
that is a singleton, then   −Maximin has been reduced to  MEU . Henceforth, according to Gneiting &
Raftery’s theorem, both EU(x) and EU(x) are strictly convex.
Now, let us consider the case in which P (X) is not a singleton. There are only three ways that
a strictly convex function could behave in [0,1]: (i) being strictly decreasing in [0,1]; (ii) being strictly
increasing in [0,1]; (iii) being decreasing then increasing. We now show that for the lower scoring rule it
must be the case (ii). For the lower scoring rule, suppose if not, we consider either (i) or (iii). However, if
it is the case (i), then the lower scoring rule is not   −Maximin, since minimum value will be the expected
utility of C(X) from the perspective of the maximum value in P (X). And we know that it then follows that
the maximum minimum of the upper scoring rule will always be reached at the maximum of P (X). Then,
we have C(X) = P (X) So, it cannot be   −Maximin-strictly proper – it is not even   −Maximin-proper. And
for the case (iii), the minimum value will be the expected utility of C(X) from the perspective of a medium
value y ∈ P (X). In other words, C(X) ≠ P (X) - it is not   −Maximin -proper, either. Then the only choice
left is (ii). Luckily, from the proof above, we know that if it is the case (ii), then it is   −Maximin-strictly
proper. So, we finish the proof of the case for the lower scoring rule. For the upper scoring rule, we ignore
the proof, since it’s just symmetric with the lower case.
To combine, we finish the proof. ￿
Theorem 48. A continuous and lexicographic local scoring rule S
L
is   −Maximin-strictly proper i↵ there ex-
ist the corresponding expected utility functions - EU(x) and EU(x) - that are strictly convex, and (i)EU(x)
is strictly decreasing, (ii) EU(x) is strictly increasing, on [0,1].
Proof : It is easy to prove this theorem once one notices that it is symmetric with the above theorem.
We ignore the proof. ￿
Theorem 49. If SG is a scoring rule for imprecise credences that satisfies Extensionality**, then it is not
strictly proper.
Proof : We prove it by reductio. Recall Example 50, if SG is strictly proper, then it must be the
case that for any decision rule   ∈ DA, we have {C ′} =  (SG,C ′). But it is impossible, since we have
C
′ ∈  (SG,C ′) → C ′′ ∈  (SG,C ′) and C ≠ C ′. So, SG is not strictly proper. Since SG is arbitrary, we get
the conclusion that if SG satisfies Extensionality**, then it is not strictly proper. ￿
Theorem 52. The global scoring rule S
G




Proof : let ￿E￿ be the cardinality of set E. We know that 0 < ￿⌦￿ = n <∞ where n ∈ N and N represents
the set of natural numbers, since we assume that there are finite possible worlds in ⌦. So, ￿X ￿ =m ∈ N <∞.
First, we prove the ‘only if’ part. Let ⌦ = {w1,w2} and let us abuse the notation and ignore {} and
make X = {w1,w2}. Let wn be true in wn. Then we know ∀P ∈ P( P ), we have P (w1) = 1 − P (w2).
Let P (w1) = [a, b], then P (w2) = [1 − b,1 − a]. Let C(w1) = [c, d] and C(w2) = [1 − b,1 − a]. Since
S
G
is   −Maximin-strictly proper, we have   −Maximin(SG, P ) = {C ′￿C ′(w1) = P (w1),C ′(w2) = P (w2)}.
Note that C(w2) = P (w2). For the global case, we only need to consider the case for w1. We then
know if [a, d] ≠ [c, d], then C ∉   −Maximin(SG, P ), since C(w1) ≠ P (w1). And if [a, d] = [c, d], then
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C ∈   −Maximin(SG, P ), since C(w1) = P (w1). It follows that for w1,   −Maximin(SL, P (w1)) = {P (w1)}.
Since P (w1) is arbitrary, we get the ‘only if’ part.
Then, we need to prove the ‘if’ part, namely we needs to prove that if   −Maximin(SL, P (X)) =
{P (X)}, then we have   −Maximin(SG, P ) = {C ￿∀X ∈X ∶ C(X) = P (X)}.
Since X is a partition, we know a proposition is either true or false at a possible world. Let wn be
the set of possible worlds that makes the proposition wn true. Let us index all the possible worlds w in ⌦
as w1,w2, ...,wn in this way. Let us abuse the notation and denote wn as the proposition that is true at
wn, too. Since these possible worlds are mutually exclusive, we get for each proposition wi ∈ X , when we
only need to consider E
C
[SG(C ′)], we only consider EC(wi)[SG(C ′(wi))]. So, for a certain proposition wi,
the best choice is the input P (wi), as shown by the proof of Theorem 46. For the successive propositions,
as there are only finite of them, we simply enumerate them. It is easy to see that for all wn ∈X , the best
choice is the input P (wn). Combining them all, we complete our proof. ￿
Theorem 53. The global scoring rule S
G




Proof : The proof of this theorem is similar to the above theorem. We ignore the proof. ￿
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4 Conclusion
I have made two main claims in this thesis. First, none of the existing proposals for defending strict
propriety in the context of precise credences is fully satisfactory. Second, in face of the Impossibility Result
for imprecise credences, we should drop the property of being real-valued, and I o↵er the general forms of
two kinds of strictly proper, continuous and lexicographic scoring rules. There are some open questions
closely related to the thesis:
● If the existing proposals are all unsatisfactory, what will be a better justification for strict propriety?
● What is the rationale for the scoring rules that have been characterized in Chapter 3?
● How can we apply the scoring rules that have been characterized in Chapter 3 to defend epistemic
norms in the context of imprecise credences?
● How to characterize other kinds of strictly proper, continuous and non-real-valued scoring rules for
imprecise credences?
In addition, since EpDT is a theory that uses the framework of decision theory to o↵er non-
pragmatic defenses for a variety of epistemic norms, several issues concerning either decision theory or
(non-)pragmatism should be further addressed.
First, on the side of decision theory,
(i) There is a debate between Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory. (23) discusses
what will happen when EpDT meets Causal Decision Theory;
(ii) There is a criticism of decision theory for not taking risk or regret attitude into consideration. (7)
develops a decision theory based on risk attitude. Applying scoring rules to investigate risk attitude has
also been investigated recently in (50). (4) considers regret in decision theory. Research in this area may
provide us with new ideas when thinking about EpDT. For instance, regarding the Additivity assumption,
some other ways of concerning the aggregation of the global scores might be considered.
Second, regarding the divide between pragmatic and non-pragmatic justifications, (39) actually o↵ers
a new pragmatic foundation of EpDT.
What is more, since this thesis addresses issues of scoring rules, it might be interesting to analyze
some related research in scoring rules, too. (9) o↵ers a review of scoring rules applied to di↵erent areas,
among which I find some philosophically interesting. Here is one research in psychology: scoring rules are
used to investigate (i) belief formation process and (ii) whether beliefs are consistent with actions. These
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